Okay. Okay.
Okay, everybody, smile.
It's okay.
Ladies and gentlemen,
the President
of the United States.
How do you prove
that someone's
not telling the truth?
So, uh, how's it feel
being out here in Afghanistan?
We're making good progress.
There is progress.
The progress that Afghanistan
is making is remarkable.
Progress across all lines
of effort.
We are making progress.
We are seeing
significant progress.
Indisputable progress.
We're making real progress.
If the news was good,
we're really making progress.
If the news was bad, it's like,
well, we had a setback,
but we're still making progress.
Progress with the roads
being built,
so farmers can get product
to market. That's progress.
Look, I'll be
very real with you.
There are times when you get
in front of a camera.
It's not that you're lying,
but you're gonna--
you're gonna paint
a pretty good picture
on the pig.
I remember somebody
who was far wiser than me
once telling me this.
The only thing that's classified
in this town is bad news.
You know, I heard a four-star
in Afghanistan say one time
it's not about winning,
it's about the perception
of winning.
And I thought, what bullshit.
-We are winning.
-We are winning.
We can and will accomplish
this mission.
Across the board,
we are winning.
-I sincerely believe we're winning.
-I do, too.
We're on track.
Every single day, we're making
progress. We're winning.
The conditions are set
for winning this w*r.
Everything changed with a tip
we had gotten about an interview
that Michael Flynn had given
to the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
It wasn't classified,
but the government
didn't want it getting out.
Is it all right if we record?
This is off the record.
So, if we're doing
such a great job,
why does it feel like
we're losing?
You know,
every measurable activity
is failing.
The narrative
was completely at odds
with what the public
had been told.
We basically know
what we're doing out here.
We're basically fighting
the wrong way.
We had to go to court,
and we found out
there were hundreds
of other interviews like this.
There were people
who served in uniform,
diplomats, aid workers,
Afghans, NATO allies.
There were people who--
If they really speak the truth,
they'll never get a job
in this town.
But we could offer
the protection of giving
anonymity.
So, it allowed these witnesses
to actually speak
with a lot more candor.
You might
not have thought
things were as bad as they are.
No, I always
thought they were bad.
Well, at least it looks good.
Probably will never work.
We were never going to succeed.
Yeah.
People were basically saying,
yeah, I was there in 2008,
I was there in 2010.
And it was a total disaster.
And we told the people.
But as it went up the chain,
all the bad stuff
had been taken out
or watered down.
It was like they were talking
about a completely different w*r
in a completely
different country.
No,
that's all we got left.
That's all we got left?
Welcome to Afghanistan.
I'm gonna ask a lot of you
over the next few weeks
and the next few months,
and I know you can do it.
I know you're ready.
Down four, five.
Run.
That's the building
they took off out of,
running that way,
that tree line.
Split this way.
Hey, get that soldier.
Don't go any closer!
No, you know, it became--
We were there so long.
Let's be honest.
And part of the reason
we may be doing a documentary
is that the American public
doesn't understand.
A lot of them tuned it out,
you know.
It was just another--
We had the Afg--
We had Iraq shoved in there
for the X number of years.
Um, so it became
sort of the background noise.
It was a w*r that was going on.
And the, uh,
you know, everyone wanted
to be there in '01, '02, '03.
I like to say, uh,
I won the lottery
or I got the, uh,
gold ring on the carousel
when I was selected
to be the deputy of what became
the Jawbreaker team,
the first team to go in.
CIA had
a preexisting relationship
with the Northern Alliance,
which was the...
the non-Taliban
part of... of Afghanistan,
a small sliver in the northeast
portion of the country
that the Taliban
did not control.
Tonight,
the United States of America
makes the following demands
on the Taliban.
Deliver to United States
authorities
all the leaders of Al-Qaeda
who hide in your land.
They will hand over
the t*rrorists...
or they will share
in their fate.
They wanted us
to bring bin Laden's head back
in a hat box on dry ice.
This is not about revenge.
It's not about retaliation.
This is about self-defense.
I don't agree with that.
The American people
wanted revenge.
I wanted revenge.
You probably wanted revenge.
I don't think President Bush
had any other recourse
to his own constituency
than to say,
we know it emanated from here.
There is no government
to deal with to say,
"Hey, you fix this."
There's no government
in Afghanistan.
It's a civil w*r.
The big thing we took in
with us was money.
We took in three million dollars
in cash to help, um,
get the Northern Alliance,
uh, onside, to work with assets,
and enable them to prosecute the campaign that we would need.
Taliban, Taliban.
I don't know how
we came up with three million.
It was enough for the first,
uh, two weeks or so.
And then we needed more.
Where is the American Army?
Where is the American Army?
Yes.
Kabul fell, I think,
early November.
And that really signaled the end.
"The Taliban" were routed.
They had either gone back
into the countryside, hiding,
or they had retreated
across the border,
their leadership, into Pakistan.
On the streets
of an Afghan city,
life appears to be returning
to normal
following the fall
of the hardline Islamic regime.
Yes,
the Taliban were routed.
I had high hopes
that Afghanistan would be
a safer place.
But we had not gotten UBL yet
or Al-Qaeda's senior leadership.
And I think until we got that,
no one thought
the mission was over.
I don't know that.
I don't think he's vanished--
He's either dead in some tunnel,
or he's alive.
And if he's alive,
he's either in Afghanistan,
or he isn't.
Local Afghan militia commanders say
they've overrun a cave
where they suspect
Osama bin Laden himself
may have been taking refuge.
In what must surely be
the closing stages of at least
-the Afghan phase of this conflict--
-Get down!
So, I got there in, like,
February of '02.
We land in Kandahar,
and we're standing
on the airfield.
The aircraft takes off.
And a 107 round comes flying
across the... the runway,
and it hits a mosque
and explodes.
And I remember my sergeant
major Dave Bruner saying,
"Well, I guess the...
the Taliban didn't get the memo
that the w*r is over."
And it was game on.
The course
of this conflict is not known.
Yet its outcome is certain.
The question at that point
in the w*r was not,
"Are we focused on Al-Qaeda?"
It's,
"How much beyond Al-Qaeda?"
And one of the first
and most obvious questions
was this question
of the Taliban.
There was a tendency
to kind of aggregate
those two together.
The Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Al-Qaeda
and their Taliban allies...
Taliban
and its Al-Qaeda allies...
Arguably, that was, uh,
making the enemy larger
than it needed to be.
Afghanistan needs to be
safe and secure...
friendly to the West,
so that it can never again
be used as a safe haven
for t*rrorists.
I remember
being taken aback
at how many valleys there were
in the East.
Looking out of the helicopter
and realizing that, you know,
for every valley we're in,
there's, like,
25 or more that we're not.
They think
they might find safe haven.
Not if we think they're there.
That whole occupation
and w*r was based
upon this myth
of the safe haven.
How big of a space do you need
to train and conduct
for a hijacking?
I think when I look
at any kind of campaign
of that magnitude,
I think you have to have
some foreign policy first.
And then the foreign policy
drives strategy.
And as a result of the strategy,
then you have plans.
I'm not sure we really went
through that process.
There it goes.
-Get a good picture of it?
-sh*t.
Duran Duran,
"Is There Something
I Should Know?"
This w*r will not be quick.
We know this from the history
of military conflict
in Afghanistan.
It's been one
of initial success...
followed by long years
of floundering...
and ultimate failure.
We're not going
to repeat that mistake.
In April of 2002,
Donald Rumsfeld
dictates out a memo,
a snowflake.
This was classified at the time,
and was later declassified,
saying,
"How are we gonna
get out of Afghanistan?"
And he ends it with one word,
"Help."
Exclamation point.
When I added it up,
I'm like, "Oh, my God, the date
on this memo he wrote...
...was the same day that Bush gave that speech."
You're like, how can this be?
I mean, it's just--
You couldn't come up
with a bigger contrast.
We're tough.
We're determined.
We're relentless.
Six months into the w*r,
Rumsfeld is saying,
"Help!
How do we get out of here?"
"We're never gonna get out." And yet, in public,
he's making fun of reporters
who ask him about the quagmire.
No, that's, uh, someone else's
business quagmires.
I don't do quagmires. Um...
Early in the w*r,
we had the upper hand.
And we had the opportunity
to leverage that upper hand
and that momentum
into some version of an outcome
like a defeated Al-Qaeda
and a mostly surrendered Taliban
with some elements
of a political...
settlement with some conditions.
We rejected that deal.
Nine five tango, over.
So, now all of a sudden...
we're gonna take
this destroyed status quo,
this power vacuum,
and we're gonna fill it
with Western
styled institutions.
The conflict is entering a new phase. The president
instructed USAID
to begin reconstruction work
in stable and peaceful areas
of the country
that are free of t*rrorists,
reconstruction of wells,
of the irrigation system,
of agriculture, of roads.
We're gonna raise
an Afghan national army.
We're gonna raise
a police force.
We're gonna have
14-plus ministries.
We're gonna have
federal government in Kabul.
We're gonna have
provincial government.
We're gonna have
local government.
We're gonna have
a judicial system.
We're gonna revamp
the prison system.
We're gonna rebuild the police.
Mr. President, you've said
on repeated occasions
that you're not
into nation building.
I don't think our troops
ought to be used
for what's called
nation building.
The so-called nation building,
I would call it
the stabilization
of a future government.
Uh, nation building
was kind of the pejorative term
for the maximalist view
of the counterinsurgency
campaign, right?
That it was not enough to defeat
the Taliban militarily.
You needed to build
those civilian elements
of governance,
those pieces
of infrastructure...
so that the rest
of the Afghan citizens
would find reason
to buy into that government.
They would see the services that it'd provide.
Their life would get better.
The United States
doesn't cut and run.
We keep our commitments.
It's in our national interest...
that the work
you're doing here...
the work of helping the Afghans
develop a democracy,
it's in the interests
of your children
and your grandchildren.
Covering it,
you sort of get the sense
that maybe there is debate
over what strategy
or what they're hoping
to accomplish.
But in these interviews,
they admit openly
that they didn't have
a strategy.
They couldn't agree
on a strategy.
There was no consensus
on what the objectives were.
We tried to establish,
and I think
every commander over there
has tried to establish metrics,
measures of effectiveness
or measures of success.
The experience
in Afghanistan
has absolutely made it clear
that just putting up
a bunch of schools
isn't going to do anything.
-Right.
-So...
How many schools were built
in the last 60 days?
Interesting.
You build the structure,
you build the thing.
But if you don't have
the teachers,
if you don't have the supplies,
and, most importantly,
if you don't have the security
of the locals that are willing
to send their children
to that school...
you have this thing
that you built.
That's not what
the Afghan people want.
People of Afghanistan,
just take a look
at this building.
It's a big, solid,
permanent structure.
We thought
the more money we throw at it,
the sooner we'll win.
This was one
of the metrics even.
How quickly can you spend money?
We've been able to put in wells.
We've been able
to build schools.
We've been able
to put in new clinics.
Five hundred
and twenty-five schools...
Three thousand, four hundred
and six projects,
reaching more
than two million people.
Kids are in school. They're learning right now.
And you can see that
with your eyes.
That's visible progress
right there.
Building schools
resonates with Americans.
Elections, women's rights,
those all resonate
with Americans.
You get-- Find political clout
back in this country
to support that.
The appropriations cycle
is based on success.
Do you wanna be
the head of an agency
that comes in and says,
"Well, you know
that 100 million dollars,
we wasted it all.
We didn't accomplish anything."
You think you're gonna get
that appropriations?
There were statistics
about life expectancy
in Afghanistan.
And we actually
couldn't believe it.
So, we went over
and we talked to the CIA,
who does a lot of analysis.
They said
it is statistically impossible
to increase the life expectancy
over that time frame.
Which is hard to start
with anyway in Afghanistan,
since they don't have a census!
They don't know
how many Afghans are alive!
You know, what's the old saying?
Statistics don't lie,
but liars use statistics.
We're also working
to educate people,
build roads,
provide good health care.
They literally couldn't
think of enough projects
to spend the money on.
We bought half a billion dollars
worth of airplanes
from the Italians
that couldn't fly,
uniforms for the Afghan military
to use in forest lands.
Well, you've been
to Afghanistan.
It's mostly a desert.
They were gonna create
a soy industry!
They don't eat soy...
...but we're trying
to create an industry.
Sexy Italian goats,
they put on a plane,
fly them to Afghanistan
to have sex
with probably
less sexy Afghan goats.
There was no success,
other than they spent
a billion dollars.
It was very uncomfortable
getting to Afghanistan
and looking at these, uh,
half complete projects,
just knowing
this isn't gonna work.
U.S. government spending
so much money
on certain sweetheart contracts.
You had generals
who then go to work
for contractors
after they leave the military.
The joke, of course,
is that it's not a joke,
it's pretty tragic.
The saying, though,
is that reconstruction
was unsuccessful in Iraq,
and it was unsuccessful
in Afghanistan,
but it was very successful
in Northern Virginia,
and very successful in Maryland.
And anyone who knows that area
knows what I'm talking about.
The growth of the defense
and weapons industries,
and then everything
that's ancillary to that,
all the hotels, the banks,
the apartment complexes.
We're spending
300 million dollars
a day for 20 years.
So, all of these things
create this incredibly
horrific condition
for endless w*r
where everyone is benefiting.
I would say what told me
that we weren't winning
it was that the security
in the country
was not getting any better.
From the time in 2002
to the evacuation,
I think I was
in Afghanistan every year.
And each time I went back,
the security situation
didn't seem as good as it was
the last time I was there.
I said, not really sure
we're doing the right thing.
I'm...
pleased with the progress
that we're making
in Afghanistan.
I mean, there is no such thing
as a Taliban.
We have liberated,
literally liberated,
village after village.
It's bullshit.
We've built more schools.
We've got more cars on the road.
You know, really?
Afghanistan is really
better today than it was?
So many senior people,
as well as mid-level people,
basically said...
we're losing.
I kind of wish some of them
had said it, you know, publicly.
Uh, but I understand
why they didn't,
because they would've
lost their job.
We are not losing it,
and, uh, the enemy cannot win.
You said you are not losing.
Are you saying
that you are winning?
You hear that time and again
that everybody says in public
we're winning the w*r.
But over there,
it's clear we're not winning.
You know, that at the low level,
it's all bad news.
And by the time
it comes out the top,
at the Pentagon
or the White House,
it's all rosy.
Out of the despe--
Out of the kind
of the desperate straits
that the Afghan people
found themselves, is now, uh...
...a, you know,
a welcoming society
beginning to grow.
How exciting. I mean, it's...
it's something good
that we're here,
or it's bad that we're here,
or what?
No, it's good. It's a good friend.
We used to call it
kites and balloons.
Anytime we saw a report
that showed a picture of a kid
with a kite or a balloon,
we knew it was gonna be
a BS report.
It was just going
to be happy talk.
Boys flying kites again.
The Taliban no longer has its,
uh, totalitarian grip
on this country.
Um, we are winning this w*r.
There are a lot of places
where I will tell you
we did make it a better place.
I mean,
you go to the big cities,
you saw open bazaars.
You saw people making money.
And the Afghans
I knew were really happy.
But it never, ever came
out of my lips, saying,
"Hey, we're winning this thing,
or I can see the light
at the end of the tunnel."
I never did see the light
at the end of the tunnel.
Over there!
Where... where?
Tell me, sir. Tell me.
The Pentagon would talk
about the number of attacks,
enemy attacks.
And for a while, you'd think,
"Okay, fewer enemy attacks,
the better, right?"
The roadside b*mb attacks
doubling last year.
Suicide attacks
quintupled last year.
No, no, no, that shows
the w*r is going well
because we're taking
the fight to the enemy
so they're firing
more shots at us.
I think the Haqqani network is
getting a little bit desperate.
They've, uh, stooped down
to use females
as suicide bombers.
The staggering rate
of civilian casualties
is proof to us
of the callous
and indiscriminate
nature of the Taliban
t*rrorists.
You know, without a question,
that what the public is going
to be exposed to
is going to be necessarily
biased in the positive.
There's no other way
to go into w*r.
No nation is going to allow
the narrative
to be completely transparent,
particularly when things
are going in the negative...
because the second
you do that...
you surrender to the enemy.
You authorized to smile in here?
Um...
Are there times
you... you say to yourself,
"Maybe I was a little bit
too upbeat
about that assessment?" Sure.
But if I say
we are making progress
on growing
the Afghan National Army,
and here are some indicators...
but I know in my mind
we got a long way to go.
That's not lying.
I don't feel that's lying.
The glass is half full.
There is progress
in many areas of Afghanistan.
I think I understood
why we as a headquarters
and myself were doing that to...
uh, get the resource support
that we thought we needed.
General McKiernan
is briefing me on...
the situation in Afghanistan...
what he's gonna need
to make sure
that we continue helping
this young democracy succeed.
When you're in a country
that has a literacy rate
of maybe 30 percent...
when the average life span is--
When I get there,
it's 43 years old.
When 75 percent of the people
that live in Afghanistan
have been at w*r
their entire life,
when there is no
government structure...
how do you-- how do you think
you're going to win
or create success
short of generational, uh,
measurements? I mean...
Ultimately,
the solution in Afghanistan
is going to be
a political solution,
not a military solution.
Uh, we're not gonna run
out of bad guys there
that want to do bad things
in Afghanistan.
Coming up! Coming up!
Come on, come on, come on,
come on, come on!
-Right there.
-Let's go!
Coming up, coming up!
Come on, come on!
Officials were under pressure
to report only good news...
so you would look
on the latest assessment report,
and you'd see, well,
that district,
it's colored that we control it.
But you go out to these
small little outposts...
and there'd being a lieutenant,
you know,
so a kid who's 23, 24,
25 years old,
and he'd have 30
or 40 American troops,
maybe about the same amount
of number of Afghan troops,
maybe less.
And you'd ask them,
what part of this district
do you control?
And they'd say,
I can control what's in the line
of sight of my machine g*ns.
You know? That'd be it.
And you'd hear that over
and over and over again.
And you saw
the impossibility of the task
put to the U.S. and NATO troops.
Go in, win hearts and minds.
And, you know, I...
Use tons and tons of troops.
you know, I mean,
I think that...
it's sort of willfully naive.
So, if it's not
sustainable, should we do it?
I love it.
I like helping the people out.
They need our help, so I'm here
to pull security for them.
There was this one
oral history interview
with an Army soldier.
And he said, you know,
think about it.
We come into their province
where they've never
seen foreigners.
They don't have airports.
We come in, and we look like
stormtroopers in Star Wars,
right? We're all kitted out.
We've got sunglasses,
and helmets,
and radio antennae
sticking out of our head,
and g*ns.
You know, no wonder there was this hostility.
Like, there were nice guys.
Like, you joke, like,
it's collegial.
And kind when, like,
the village comes together
and sh*t. But I...
I wasn't a part of their life,
and they weren't a part of mine.
I was wearing body armor,
and a big f*cking r*fle
and sunglasses.
And, you know,
they were harvesting poppy.
It's just different worlds.
I don't know who the enemy is,
and I certainly didn't
at the time.
I need you guys to tell me
when people bring these
into your village.
Shame on you if you follow
foreign... foreign leaders
that come here and talk you
into fighting
against your own country,
and they do nothing for you.
I would go out, like,
hoping to be shot at.
If we had sn*pers out
and hide somewhere,
we would be told to patrol
in certain areas
where it was likely
that we would get shot at,
so that these guys
could get them.
It's like, well,
we're creating the conditions
under which
this is gonna happen.
This is the exact spot
that we were...
...when we got hit
last time so...
When you do these
presence patrols,
we sometimes call them,
like, bait patrols,
recon patrols,
all those types of things,
you're not moving
towards something.
You don't have an objective
or the enemy is here, right?
It's not like they were
trying to, like,
punch a hole in the line.
You're walking around, like,
kind of hoping to get shot at.
And they were sh**ting us
because we were walking around.
Yeah, he's right f*cking there!
Hey, he's still in there!
The counterinsurgency
principle was,
of course, you're gonna put
these troops...
into these areas, and they'll be
met with resistance,
and we'll take casualties.
At some point,
you're supposed to degrade
the Taliban's ability
to conduct operations.
At some point, our casualties
start to come down.
And all we ever saw
was the opposite.
I got him!
Line three, Doc.
Bravo, Charlie.
We'd been shot at
since we got there.
And we saw them well before it,
so we got to start
maneuvering on them.
It took about three hours
of kind of shadow dancing.
Eventually we kind of
outmaneuvered them
and trapped them
against the river.
And enough of the townspeople,
we thought,
had gotten out of the way, um,
that we were able to get
some air on station.
Big higher-up sent us down
two A10s,
so we could k*ll these dudes.
And the...
A10s come in the first time,
it's f*cking amazing.
It's the coolest thing
you've seen.
After that first run,
they ended up doing six total.
But after that first one,
after the ground explodes,
we thought everybody
had gotten out.
And like,
a million f*cking people pop out
from behind this little berm
where they are
and start f*cking sprinting,
right?
The guy behind me
who's in charge of me
kind of said, "Hey, see that guy
in white, f*cking..." you know.
I said, yeah.
Then he disappears.
Then, hey, he pops up again,
f*cking k*ll that dude.
f*ck, here we go.
This is-- this is it.
This is my chance
to do the thing.
I was getting ready, like,
this is the perfect moment.
I dreamed about k*lling people
for, you know, three years.
I had prepared for it.
So, anyway, he popped up again,
and I'm tracking him,
but I'm looking for a g*n
in his hands.
I really wanted to, like
before I pull the trigger,
I just wanna make sure
that this was, like,
one of the fighters
that we were doing.
And at 440, even with
a high-powered scope, like,
you know,
you see colors and blobs.
So I go, f*ck, man, like,
"Does he have
a f*cking g*n or not?"
And he disappears again.
I'm like, f*ck.
Like, I just missed this chance
to k*ll this dude.
Like, what if I don't
have that chance again?
Well, he f*cking said
to k*ll him,
so I've got an order.
So, like, regardless,
and we're in this f*cking
combat scenario,
so it's all good. Um...
he pops up again,
and he's like...
covering his, like... It--
Like, what I--
In my head,
it's his wife and kid,
I don't know.
It looked like a woman
and a f*cking small child.
And it's just a guy
who lived around there.
Um, and he was just upset that,
you know, or scared
because these f*cking
big-a*s planes
had just dropped a bunch
of 30 mike-mike into his world,
um, on a weird f*cking,
whatever, Friday afternoon.
Um...
so that was this moment of,
like...
personal reflection,
because the truth is, like,
I could've f*cking popped
the guy
the first time I had him, right?
And was I really looking
for a g*n,
or was I just not sure enough
that I was actually
gonna k*ll him
and then I needed, like,
a breath?
I was like, I'll get him again.
But what if that hesitation
had been something else?
And what if that guy
had actually been Taliban
and had been one of the people
that planted one of the bombs
that ended up, like,
k*lling my friends later, right?
I just let a guy off the hook.
And I got to be around
all the other people
afterwards, too.
And everybody asks, like,
"Hey, Lucy, did you f*cking--
Did you sh**t during the time?"
On the report, like,
"Did you expend any rounds?"
Like, actually, like,
"No, I didn't."
"Well, why not?
Did you not see anybody?"
You know, how do you, like,
tell that story
around these other people?
You don't want me
to think you're a coward. So...
I started questioning myself.
And then you start
to question the w*r and sh*t.
You're like, "Wait," or like,
"Why am I in situations
like this?" "And why is it hard
to distinguish between
these people?"
Well,
this is a new kind of, uh,
new kind of evil.
Now, this... this crusade...
this w*r on terrorism...
uh, is gonna take a while.
We will rid
the world of the evil doers.
Tell him,
turn around. Turn around.
All right. He's good.
Show me where they're at. Hurry up, hurry up.
Trying to figure out
who the enemy was,
was a real problem.
There was an Afghan
special forces advisor,
and he said
the American troops
would always ask him,
"But where are the bad guys?"
"Show me where
the bad guys are in the map."
"Who are we fighting?"
Okay, here's... here's the thing.
I'm gonna ask this question
one more time, one more time.
Who was digging?
If you don't know
who's who,
you can't speak the language,
you don't know
the tribal history,
you don't know the culture.
Some of the Afghans
figured out from the get-go,
the way to get the Americans
to rub out your rival
is to just call them Taliban.
Afghan commandos
and US special operations forces
launched a raid
to capture Mullah Sadiq,
a high-ranking Taliban leader.
Sadiq and 30 Taliban fighters
were k*lled in the operation.
That night, I got a call
from the head of
the Afghan intelligence service,
and he says...
"Do you know
your special ops guys
have just k*lled...
60 innocent villagers
out in Azizabad?"
Immediately, I said,
"Okay, let me--
Let me check on this."
And I call our...
our special forces commander.
And this person,
to remain nameless...
um...
said the Afghans had exaggerated
the civilian casualties.
It was really only a half dozen.
The Taliban and their supporters
are running
a very effective
propaganda campaign
to discredit coalition efforts.
Exaggerated claims of damage
often result in demands
for more money in compensation.
Chris Jackson and I
were embedded
with the troops
conducting the raid.
Neither he nor I saw
any noncombatants k*lled.
Never in history
have military forces
tried to exercise such care
to avoid civilian casualties.
The next day...
the UN ambassador had me over
to his compound,
ostensibly to have breakfast
and talk about things.
And he said,
"Come up to my office.
I want to show you a video."
We k*lled...
civilians in that raid,
more than should have happened
even with a minimum
collateral damage.
It was a bad target.
I sent
one of my own guys out there...
to start an investigation.
And, uh...
the truth was not
what the special ops commander
told me.
He either lied unknowingly,
or he lied knowingly.
I don't know, 'cause the target,
uh, Mullah Sadiq,
I don't think was k*lled
or captured that night.
This was probably
sort of a revenge
between private
security contractors.
And one might've ratted out
the other one
and had a target put on them.
The investigation revealed
ArmorGroup relied
on a series of warlords
to provide men
for its guard force
at Shindand Air Base.
The company called
those warlords
Mr. Pink, Mr. White.
Those names, by the way,
were drawn
from Quentin Tarantino movie
called Reservoir Dogs.
f*ck you, White.
That's when I first heard
about ArmorGroup
and Mr. White and Mr. Pink,
and all that.
They were being
fed intelligence
by people with conflicting
motives and allegiances.
But if you admit
there was a mistake,
you're putting people's careers
on the line.
Somebody might get
court martialed.
Somebody might get hauled
before Congress
to answer for it.
So, they only made the report,
the full report public,
ten years later,
after USA Today
sued them in federal court.
And in the end,
in Afghanistan,
the backlash
was so much stronger
because of this unwillingness
to admit mistakes.
We have two wars going on,
and we have more contractors,
more contractors than...
than Defense Department people
in those wars.
Well, I mean, you know,
if you contract with somebody,
and you don't know who you're contracting with...
...it's an accountability issue.
We don't have the organic,
in-house capability
-to provide security.
-Correct.
The defense contracts
were just this enormous amount
of cash flowing
into the w*r zone,
with Afghan contractors,
U.S. contractors,
other foreign companies.
So, the light bulb
finally went on.
Maybe we need to stop this
or get our arms around it.
The Pentagon called and said,
"We need to find out
who these subcontractors are,
who the shadows are
that are receiving all our money
and stealing it from us.
Can you do that?"
Being a forensic accountant,
this was like the Super Bowl.
This... this was the...
the granddaddy of them all.
The mission was
to get visibility
on where all the money
is flowing to, who's benefiting.
So, I said,
"I need financial records."
"Oh, we got
all the financial records."
They didn't have any.
Money's coming in
from U.S. Treasury.
It's going
to the implementing partners,
and it's supposed to be used
for roads,
schools, power grids.
But what was it,
ten years later?
And they didn't have
any financial records.
So, it's kind of like,
what do we do,
just stare at the screen?
And nothing magical
is gonna pop up.
I'd say, well, how's it coming?
You know,
how's... how is the road?
He goes, we don't know.
We've to rely on them
telling us,
'cause we can't go out there,
it's not safe.
So, eventually we started...
I started going off base
to central banks.
I got to a point
where I became so ingrained
into the central bank guys
that we were playing volleyball
every afternoon
at three o'clock.
I mean, it's just--
We became friends.
They hated corruption.
They hated the suicide bombing.
They hated the killings
as much as we did.
And I was mentoring them.
I mean, they would call me
and say, "Tom, Tom."
"I got a million dollars flowing
through this account."
"Is that a red flag?"
"Hell, yes. Don't do anything.
I'm coming right down."
The fuel contracts,
the food contracts,
the weapons contracts.
I mean,
that's where the money was.
The Taliban would extort
the contractors.
You either pay me,
and I'll make sure your supplies
are shipped safely,
or don't pay me, and who knows
what's going to happen?
They would talk
about this bridge
that kept getting blown up.
And they would pay
this local district official
to rebuild the bridge.
He had a brother
who was in the Taliban.
So, he'd build the bridge,
and he'd tell his brother
in the Taliban,
"Okay, now you can blow it up."
And it didn't dawn
on the Americans
that this was why
they kept having to rebuild
the same damn bridge
all the time.
The U.S. military
has often stated
that money is a weapons system.
We came up with a rule of thumb.
Twenty-five percent
is being stolen,
and it's ending up
in the hands of Taliban
or the insurgents or Al-Qaeda.
Six frag grenades on him.
Now six AK47 mags on him.
He had 10,000 U.S. dollars.
We'd have those gu--
"Who's stealing the money?"
"Who's funding the bad guys?"
"You tell me."
"We'll do night raids."
Tell all the people
that live here
to step back over there.
-Are those all kids?
-Yeah.
I always got
a kick out of they asked,
is it okay if we sh**t someone
if we have to?
They're asking me.
It's-- That's why I said,
"Just don't sh**t the computer."
Corruption is endemic
to Afghanistan.
Endemic corruption
and persistent
qualitative deficiencies.
The goodness and the generosity
of the American people...
is being abused.
There was a lessons learned
interview
with a guy named Barnett Rubin,
who was
a State Department advisor.
And he says,
corruption's a problem.
But there's one ingredient
you need for corruption,
and that's money.
And it's all our money
that we're giving to them.
You know, we're the ones
that are enabling it.
At every road checkpoint,
the police are on the take.
Today, this country
is a rising democracy.
Families have to pay bribes
to get their power switched on,
or their ID papers issued.
The United States is here
at the request
of an Afghan government
elected by the people.
The idea was, if we can prop up
this Afghan government,
that'll win the w*r.
Then there won't be any support
for the insurgency,
for the Taliban.
We tried to import
democratic elections
to Afghanistan.
And at first,
it seemed like it worked.
There was widespread support
for Hamid Karzai
when he was elected president
in 2004.
We have a presidential election,
and I'm glad
it turned out to be good for me.
I know how you feel.
I end up
on the Afghan Army base
at the elections,
and I see them stuff
the ballot boxes.
And when I report this
back up to Kabul,
the embassy response was,
"Well, since it was an ill*gal
polling station,
it didn't exist."
"So, we don't need
to get your report on it."
Every election after that,
with the help
of the United States,
was rigged.
Again, that kind of speculation
is not all that useful.
We have American ideals
and expectations
that we think
should be transplanted
to a place like Afghanistan.
We think
everybody wants to be like us...
everybody wants the same
sort of societal structure
that we have in this country,
and they don't.
We're developing
really a rule of law, uh, group.
This will be
the courthouse, basically.
This will be the courthouse.
We built a lot of courthouses,
and we trained a lot of judges.
The whole idea
was to create a justice system.
But it was very corrupt
'cause you had to pay people off
to get your case heard,
or it would take months or years
for the cases
to go through the Afghan courts.
They want immediate justice.
And believe it or not,
they had a judicial system.
It just wasn't ours.
You lose, you win,
off with your hand,
you've got to pay this.
I mean, it was brutal justice,
but it was swift.
And it was
a very powerful message
for the Taliban to say,
"We're here fighting
for justice, and fairness,
and Islam."
"Those people are all crooks."
What should be
the U.S. exit strategy?
When and how do we--
-You're right.
-...should the U.S. leave?
Well,
we'll keep them prisoners there.
There will be no exit.
I used to fly from Kabul
to Dubai, sit in first-class,
and just look for the guys
that have briefcases...
...because they must
have cash in those briefcases.
And they did.
There was a lot of cash
literally being flown
out of Afghanistan
on an Afghan airline
that was owned
by the chairman of Kabul Bank.
Kabul Bank
It was a private bank
with a lot of connections
to very prominent
public individuals.
The Americans knew
that there were problems,
and yet, really turned
a blind eye to this.
The run on the bank
began last Wednesday
after reports that tens
of millions of dollars
had been given to allies
of President
Hamid Karzai's government.
This was a real test
for the Afghan government.
Was the rule of law
going to come out ahead,
or was corruption going
to come out ahead?
Whoever has violated the law...
if there is a violation
of the law,
will be dealt with legally.
I remember one guy saying,
"Yeah, Tom, this is all good,
and we believe you, uh,
but it will never happen."
"Karzai will shut
everything down."
"He'll never let you proceed."
This was a big debate
in the U.S. government.
We should prosecute
those people.
We shouldn't tolerate
the corruption.
But they recognized
it was going in the pockets
of our own allies
in the Afghan government.
So, what were they going to do,
throw out the whole system?
They just kind of put up
with it.
We wanted to teach them
the Western culture.
We did.
Corruption, bribery,
stealing, money...
It's the Wild West.
The corruption
was just so massive
that they basically turned
all the local population away
from the Karzai government.
Afghanistan will not allow
the international community
leave it before we are fully
on our feet,
before we are strong enough
to defend our country,
before we are powerful enough
to have a good economy,
and before we have taken
from President Bush,
and the next administration,
billions and billions
of more dollars.
No way that they can let you go.
Yeah,
you better hurry up in my case.
-Thank you, sir.
-Most welcome.
-Thank you all. Thank you.
-Take care.
Thank you very much.
Thank you. Pose together.
Anytime you're in a conflict
where you're asking
the question...
"Is it worth it?"
You're probably in a conflict
where you can guess
the answer to that.
My experience was
that there was a very natural...
cognitive bias at play.
Part of the reason I think
it's so important for us
to end the w*r in Iraq,
is to be able to get more troops
into Afghanistan,
put more pressure
on the Afghan government
to do what it needs to do.
Keep on pushing!
Keep on pushing!
There tends to be
a stronger bias to action
than to inaction.
You're going on the offense,
tired of playing defense.
Let's go!
They're hitting the target!
Fifty meters...
-Seventy-five meters!
-Fifty meters...
In the past seven years,
our efforts
have been undermanned,
under-resourced,
and underfunded.
This goal is achievable.
Stay down. Stay down.
Hey, I'm moving! Don't sh**t me!
It's easy to believe
that we're just not there yet.
A little bit more resources,
a little bit more time,
and we'll turn the corner,
and something will change.
Since the surge was announced,
there has been
considerable progress made
throughout the country.
Up around that corner.
Keep them--
-IED. We're good.
-Keep going! Keep going!
The American public thinks
the term "surge"
is a military strategy.
Surge in Iraq and Afghanistan
was a sign of military failure.
We had to bring more forces.
President Obama
has committed nearly 52,000
additional troops
to Afghanistan.
Additional military forces
by themselves
will not guarantee victory
for the Afghan people.
Was I not as, um...
optimistic or... or...
flowing in praise of all
our efforts in Afghanistan?
Proba-- Yeah,
that probably played into it.
I'm a pragmatic person
by nature,
and I'm not...
I'm not going to sell something
that I don't believe in.
In large parts of Afghanistan,
we don't see progress.
I have consistently said
that, ultimately,
the outcome in Afghanistan
will not be a military outcome.
It will be a political outcome.
I wasn't positive enough
about "winning,"
whatever winning means,
in Afghanistan.
Let's get a new leader.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates
fired General David McKiernan.
McKiernan's replacement,
-General Stanley McChrystal...
-The first time
a commander in the middle
of a w*r
has been removed since 1951.
Today, we have a new policy
set by our new president.
I believe
that new military leadership
also is needed.
And I-- I think--
I mean, in some ways,
we're learning as we go here.
Quite honestly, I was told,
"Hey, you could just retire
in the summer of 2009."
I had told the Afghans
that I was going to be here
for at least a couple of years.
I was here for the long haul.
I told my family that.
Uh, I had a son serving
in Afghanistan at the same time.
I had a daughter at West Point.
So, if you want to replace me,
then fire me.
"Okay, we'll fire you.
No problem."
To fire a w*r commander
is unheard of.
The conclusion,
from the top down
through the military ranks
if you are too honest,
your career will be over.
So the spin only got worse
from there.
By the summer of 2011,
it will be clear
to the Afghan people
that the insurgency
will not win,
giving them the chance
to side with their government.
From that point forward,
while we plan
to have fewer combat forces
in harm's way--
The lady with the sign
will remove herself immediately.
They're sh**ting
from the left side of that wall!
You got to get
the machine g*n there.
Pick up the suppression.
Hey, which one is it?
Get up!
Hey, get down,
get down, get down!
Down, down, down!
We got one dead ahead.
We got one f*cking wounded.
One dead, one wounded.
They were saying that we were
doing well over there.
We weren't doing well
over there.
'Cause if we were doing well
over there,
then why the corruption?
Why the hidden sh*t?
Why all the moves
under the carpet?
Like, Camp Brown got
a lot of money
because of Special Forces.
I was out there
with the commander,
and there was a stack of TMRs
that was--
Or transportation
movement requests,
and he was signing them.
Those loads never happened.
I submitted those TMRs
at TOIFOR.
I submitted them.
And then they kicked them
over to Tuazu,
"Made it look like
those loads happened."
But the trucks
did not get loaded,
did not show up to Kandahar,
and did not get offloaded
at the site.
They were ghost trucks.
Yes, they were fake orders.
He explained to me
they were fake orders.
I'm not saying that all
of them wasn't real,
but there was definitely a lot
of trucks being paid for
that did not get moved.
So then he told me one day,
"I'm going
to show you something."
He's like,
"But you can't tell nobody."
I was like,
"What the f*ck is going on?"
In my head.
In my head, I'm like,
"What the f*ck is going on?"
And then, uh,
they brought in duffel bags.
Like, I'm talking duffel bags...
like that, of money.
I'd never seen that much money.
I mean, from where I grew up
to where I was at that moment,
I was like, "Oh, my God."
And, I mean, it was crisp money.
So it was just like...
like it just came off the press,
like the cash just fell
out of the sky.
Because it was...
it was U.S. currency,
and it was, um,
like a 100-dollar bill.
I mean, I seen it.
I'd seen the money,
brand-new, brand-new money.
I had to ask him, I said,
"Well, how do we plan
on getting that--"
"How do you plan
on getting that money
back to the United States?"
And he's like,
"Oh, we're going
to put it in VCRs,
or DVD players."
I was like, "What?"
He's like, "Yeah, we're going
to rip the guts out of it,
and put it in there."
I was like, "Oh, okay."
I had brought it up
to my chain of command,
letting them know
what was going on.
They told me
to keep it hush, hush.
Don't say anything.
Just leave it alone.
He's getting ready
to leave anyhow.
Steal money, spent TMRs,
getting kickbacks,
it was
a well-thought-out process,
well-oiled machine we'll say,
because it had to have been
in effect, it had to have--
I don't know
if it happened six months
before I got there,
or a year before I got there,
or when
the w*r itself kicked off.
They knew how to get that money
back to the United States.
It had to have been done
over and over and over again.
There was no accountability.
If anybody lost a promotion,
it's probably some buck private
who backed up a backhoe
into an airplane.
He's probably serving time
in Leavenworth.
But not the general
who wasted 36 million dollars,
you know, not the people
who lied to Congress.
They had me wear a wire,
told me they were going
to get everybody else.
And instead of charging
everybody else,
they charged me.
If I was the only one charged
on the case,
who did I--
Did I aid and abet myself?
I can remember
being on the embassy base
and saying,
"Okay, we're finding money
going to the wrong hands,"
and someone making the comment,
"Oh, don't go down that road."
"Then we got to do a report,
and we'll have to report it
to Congress."
"Don't go down that road"?
How about fixing the problem?
You know,
we issued over 700 reports.
I had doors slammed
in my face by generals.
There was this exaggeration
after exaggeration
of what we accomplished,
and it went all the way
up to the president.
I had people accusing me
of k*lling Marines
because we issued reports.
This report is not an attack
on our military.
It is not an attack
on our mission, sir.
It is trying to help
the mission.
I remember the first time
I went over to the Pentagon.
He took all of our audits,
shoved them across the table,
and said, "These are sh*t."
"And, you know,
I got your predecessor fired."
There is an odor of mendacity
throughout
the Afghanistan issue.
I mean, I'm sorry
to get upset about this,
but it's--
After 12 years of saying this,
and telling Congress,
and telling the American people,
I'm tired.
I am tired.
There was an interview
with Douglas Lute.
He was what they called
the "w*r Czar"
in both the Bush
and the Obama White House.
You know, he was very blunt
about this w*r.
"If the American people knew
the magnitude
of this dysfunction,
2,400 lives lost,
who will say this was in vain?"
For a three-star Army general
to even suggest
that 2,400 American troops
had lost their lives in vain,
I can't even adequately explain
how remarkable that is.
I start to think about it,
and then I say,
"What am I doing?"
Knowing what I know,
knowing where I believe
this is going to go,
how can I go home,
meet the family of some kid
k*lled over here
and tell them it was worth it?
Bob Herbert,
the New York Times columnist,
writes a very poignant column
on the occasion
of McNamara's death.
Robert McNamara
was the Secretary
of Defense all through Vietnam.
He gives a confession
towards the end of his life
admitting that they knew
the Vietnam w*r was a lie.
They misled the American public
over and over again
throughout the w*r.
Herbert says,
that's great
that McNamara did this.
But what does it matter?
It matters
what you do in the moment.
And that really started
a process going of,
who am I as an individual?
What am I going to do
with my life?
And I wrote a note
to my dad, uh...
And he wrote me a note back.
He said McNamara
was an evil man, uh...
And that he prayed
that our leaders in D.C.
were better than him,
but he doubted that.
And he wanted me to do
what was right for me.
That's what I needed
to hear to...
to have some degree of courage
to do the right thing.
I submitted a resignation.
I wrote up this letter.
The anger I had...
for the people
who knew what was occurring.
That the w*r was based on lies.
That the w*r could not be won.
And they chose willingly
to do what would not work.
On Monday morning,
I'm still in Zabul Province,
and I get a phone call
from the director
of Afghan operations.
And his first words to me are,
"Are you going to go public
with this?"
That upset me
because I had no intentions
of that.
But also, too,
it showed what they cared about.
They didn't care about what
the reality of this w*r was.
They didn't care about what
the escalation of w*r would do.
They cared about whether or not
their narrative
was going to be upset
by somebody speaking
to the press.
U.S. and U.K. forces
have made progress.
The sense of progress
among those closest
to the fight is palpable.
Our strategy is working.
Well, I think we..
we hadn't finished the mission
of getting bin Laden,
uh, bringing him to justice,
which almost certainly meant
k*lling him, right?
He wasn't going to be brought
to court.
I guess he could have been,
but that was not the way
it was going to go down.
You can argue
it was worth a trillion dollars.
It was worth
the casualties that we took,
uh, "The blood and treasure,"
as they say. Um...
You could argue that.
But if that's the purpose
was to k*ll
Al-Qaeda's senior leadership
and prevent
another homeland attack
we succeeded at that.
USA! USA!
Now the pitch,
and it's lined foul
into the seats.
Down the third base line
one ball, one strike.
And I'll tell you
what's going on.
The crowd is chanting "USA,"
and the reason for that
is that there
are reports circulating
that Osama bin Laden is dead.
Bin Laden is dead.
Can it be, ladies and gentlemen?
Could it be?
After all this heartache,
all this search,
all this failure.
Good evening.
Tonight, I can report
to the American people
and to the world
that the United States
has conducted an operation
that k*lled Osama bin Laden,
the leader of Al-Qaeda.
USA! USA! USA!
Justice has been done.
We defeated
that part of the threat,
and succeeded in that part
of the strategy.
Putting all that aside,
because it's a t*rror1st group,
and because they are trying
to provoke a reaction
that could be counterproductive
to our own interests,
we have an obligation...
to think about
whether or not we're playing
into the enemy's strategy
in how we react
to a t*rror1st attack.
Don't forget.
What we're trying to do
is prevent the reoccurrence
of 9/11.
And that's a really,
really hard objective
because you're never done
achieving it.
The tide has turned.
We broke the Taliban's momentum.
At that point,
you see this shift
in how the United States fights
its wars,
where we're just going
to use proxy forces.
We're going to use contractors
and CIA people, right?
We're going to use drones,
all these things
that can't be exposed,
all these things
that can't be known.
This morning,
I'm sure you may have seen
The Washington Post.
Indicates-- The headline
is on the front page,
quote, "Most in U.S. Say
Afghan w*r
Isn't Worth Fighting."
They didn't want there
to be coverage
of the w*r in Afghanistan
after 2013.
The U.S. military
really choked off access.
A lot of people
didn't even know.
They were like,
are we still at w*r there?
You know, 'cause President Obama
had promised back in 2014
that he would end the w*r.
In just a few days,
our combat mission
in Afghanistan will be over.
Our longest w*r
will come to a responsible end.
And that gives us
an opportunity to step back
and reflect upon all
that these families
have given us.
Today marks an end of an era
and the beginning of a new one.
Today NATO completes
its combat mission,
a 13-year endeavor filled
with significant achievements.
We've been at this for 13 years.
Fourteen years.
Fifteen years of w*r.
For 16 years,
we've been in the fight.
The longest w*r
in American history,
longer than Vietnam,
World w*r I,
World w*r II combined.
My successor
has a solid foundation
for continued progress
in Afghanistan.
America is winning again.
We are winning like
we have not won in a long time.
And if you can't level
to the American public,
why you're there?
For more than 18 years.
Nineteen years,
going on 20 years.
You're in trouble.
There is no part of our strategy
which intends to stay
in Afghanistan forever.
The way we left...
was not only
a national disgrace, in my mind.
Um, it was criminal.
We have taken a decisive step
toward peace,
real peace in Afghanistan.
We were fighting for over a year
to see
the withdrawal agreement signed
by the Trump Administration
and the Taliban.
The Taliban knew
what we were in it.
The Trump Administration knew
what was in it.
But the American people
never did.
The American people paid
for this damn w*r.
The American people gave
their kids to die in this w*r.
And the American people
don't know,
but the Taliban knows.
So, who are we protecting?
They are nothing but th*gs,
and criminals, and predators,
and, that's right, losers.
We will not conduct
a hasty rush to the exit.
We'll do it responsibly,
deliberately, and safely.
The United States misses
that May 1st, 2021 deadline
to have all its troops out
of Afghanistan,
even though Joe Biden apologized
and said we'll get out
by September 11th.
The Taliban say, no.
And they launched
their campaign,
and within four months,
they had taken Kabul.
People throughout Afghanistan,
even though they don't support
the Taliban,
they didn't fight them.
They didn't join them.
They just got out of their way,
because the Taliban,
at that point,
were a better option
than the Afghan government.
And I think anyone
who looks at that can say,
"My God,
what did we do in Afghanistan
to make the Taliban
a better option
for the Afghan people
than the Afghan government was?"
There is a home for you
in the United States,
if you so choose,
and we will stand with you
just as you stood with us.
Every step of the way,
we f*cked these people over.
We created a program
that made the illusion
of safety possible
if you did these requirements.
And then we made it damn near,
um, you know, impossible
to actually complete
those same requirements.
For me, since I was already
in law school
when all of this happened,
I wanted to take the thing
that I was already doing.
Um, yeah,
a bar card and being admitted
and having a license
to practice law
is sometimes
an incredibly powerful weapon.
We've got passports
for everybody, um...
How many Taliban...
kind of full-time security guys,
fighters, army Taliban guys
do you think are there
in Herat, right about?
A hundred? Five-hundred?
A thousand.
Right.
-Yeah.
-JAWID:
f*ck, man.
Dude,
that's scary as hell. Like...
Yeah, I'm just sorry, man.
I know there's a lot of guys
who are trying really hard.
So-- I mean,
I just want to say thanks
for supporting the troops
that were there for so long.
And, you know, I know
it's really hard right now
to go through this, and so,
I don't know, man.
We owe you, so I'm going to try.
Yeah.
Yeah, yeah, Jafar and Mohammed.
Yeah.
The way
that anything gets better
is we acknowledge truth.
We talk honestly
about what happened
in the last 20 years.
And what scares me the most
is that those conversations
still aren't happening.
Nobody's being honest.
There's a lot
of political narratives
about who was at fault, um,
or what should be done,
or who cares,
or who doesn't care.
What there isn't a lot is, um,
of people taking an honest look
at themselves,
the American public looking
at itself,
DOD looking at itself,
the government
and the State Department
looking at itself,
elected leaders
looking at themselves
and realizing,
every single one of us
had a part in this.
If you go back
to the very beginning
in the w*r,
Rumsfeld was asked
at one of his
first press conferences...
Um, of course, this conjures up
Winston Churchill's
famous phrase
when he said sometime
the-- Don't quote me on this.
Okay?
I don't want to be quoted
on this.
So, don't quote me.
Uh, he said, sometimes
the truth is so precious,
it must be accompanied
by a bodyguard of lies,
talking about the invasion date
and the invasion location.
Rumsfeld gave
this kind of circular answer.
He was talking
about World w*r II,
and Winston Churchill.
And then he circled back
and said,
"I'll always tell the truth."
There are dozens of ways
to avoid having to put yourself
in a position
where you're lying.
And I don't do it.
But then
the follow up question is,
"What about everybody else
at the department?"
You've got to be kidding.
Well, I'm just asking.
You know, and everybody laughed.
But, you know,
the clear subtext was,
"Of course we're not going
to tell you the truth."
You know, maybe we won't lie
to your face all the time,
but don't expect this whole
enormous Defense Department
to come clean either.
The lies weren't why we lost,
but they reflect
why the w*r lasted
as long as it did.
One of the problems
with accountability
this was the longest w*r
in American history,
so there's an awful lot
of people
who bear responsibility
for that.
When I was going in
for the sixth time,
I get this call that
there's a lady downstairs.
And she's a Gold Star Mom.
And would I like to speak
to her? I said, absolutely.
She says, "Hey, I understand
you're going back
to Afghanistan." I said, "I am."
She goes, my son was this guy.
I said,
"I remember your son very well."
She said, "I want to know
if my son died in vain or not."
And I said, "I can tell you
right now what my feelings are."
She goes,
"I don't want to know."
"Now, I want you to go
to Afghanistan for a year
and come back and tell me
my son didn't die in vain."
I took that lady's phone number,
and I had it on my desk
for 13 months.
I thought about that lady
every single day.
And I went out
to the Helmand Province
and found out the things he did.
He was delivering babies.
He was treating kids.
He was saving people's lives.
So, when I landed in Dulles
13 months later,
I picked up the phone,
and called her.
And I said,
"Your son did not die in vain,
and here's why."
I'd hate to have
that conversation
with her today.
I would.
Not that her son died in vain.
But how we left it.
All the people
that helped us
all the people
who fought with us...
there was a lot of men and women
that worked really hard,
and a lot of great Afghans
that really wanted peace
and prosperity in their country.
They weren't thinking about
the perception of winning.
They wanted to win this.
I am convinced
that there is a hubris,
an ideal driven hubris
in this country
that thinks if we intervene
somewhere in the world,
we're going to make it
kind of look like us
when we leave.
And that's not
an easy proposition.
There's no good w*r.
w*r is a--
Almost the most inhumane thing
that people can do.
There's no goodness in w*r.
But we had a chance.
We had a chance
to make things better
and leave Afghanistan better
than we found it.
And we screwed that up.
But it wasn't because
our American servicemen
and women
were not up to the task.
You can avoid history.
But history won't avoid you.
After Vietnam,
we said we're never going
to do it again.
After Iraq,
we said we're never going
to do it again.
After Afghanistan,
we say we're never going
to do it again.
They lie.
They're lying to you.
We are doing it again,
and we will do it again.
So let's learn some lessons
before we really screw it up
the next time around.
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Bodyguard of Lies (2025)
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