[cable car bell clangs]
NARRATOR: In June , at San Francisco's luxurious Clift Hotel,
eight of the country's most talented young scientists
and engineers assembled for a secret meeting.
For the previous months, they had been working together
at Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory outside of Palo Alto,
developing a technology that promised to be revolutionary.
But in recent months, William Shockley,
the head of the company and the mind behind that technology,
had become increasingly erratic.
Now, the eight were conspiring to defect--
to quit Shockley and form their own firm,
under the leadership of one of their own,
-year-old Robert Noyce,
a Midwesterner with a brilliant scientific mind
and the genuine affability of a born salesman.
It had taken some convincing to get Noyce onboard.
LESLIE BERLIN: Noyce had a young family.
And to leave sort of a known paycheck
for something that there was no model for,
this notion of breaking away and doing something different.
NARRATOR: Soon it came time to seal the deal.
In the absence of an official contract,
eight newly-minted dollar bills were passed around the table
for signatures.
Noyce got out his pen.
MICHAEL MALONE: I honestly think that Silicon Valley begins
on a very specific morning.
That morning is the morning that the guys from Shockley
don't know if Noyce is going to go.
And he gets in the car that morning and goes with them.
BERLIN: Those dollar bills they signed
are Silicon Valley's declaration of independence--
a statement that we are going to go out and start a company
according to our own ideals and our own beliefs,
and nothing is going to stop us.
NARRATOR: On that morning in ,
none of the eight defectors likely had any idea
what would happen next.
The coining of the phrase "Silicon Valley"
was more than ten years in the future.
The unique business culture
with which the place would come to be associated--
openness over hierarchy, risk over stability,
innovation over the tried and true-- had still to be tested.
And the integrated circuit the revolutionary technology
that would usher in a new era in human history--
had yet to be invented.
That morning,
the future Silicon Valley was just a speck on the map
and a most unexpected place for the Information Age to begin.
Had it not been for William Shockley,
everything that was to come
might well have happened somewhere else.
At the time that Shockley planted his flag
in California's Santa Clara Valley, south of San Francisco,
in , the area was known mainly for its orchards--
mile upon lush, green mile of fruit trees,
heavy with apricots, cherries, almonds.
Marketers had dubbed it "The Valley of Heart's Delight."
JAY LAST: When I was ,
I was living in a steel mill town in Pennsylvania
and had a free summer between my junior and senior year
and decided to hitchhike to California.
And I spent the summer picking apricots in Santa Clara Valley.
It was just an unbelievably beautiful area
with all these fruit trees.
NARRATOR: Far from the nation's banking and manufacturing centers,
the Santa Clara Valley was not, at first glance,
an obvious spot for a technology company.
All of the leading electronics firms--
Westinghouse, General Electric, Raytheon, IBM--
then had their headquarters on the East Coast.
But Shockley had personal ties to the valley--
his mother had lived there for years--
and the land was blessedly cheap.
Hoping to entice aerospace and electronics companies
to the region,
Stanford University was offering long-term leases in Palo Alto
at bargain-basement prices.
KATHLEEN COHEN: Setting aside land that could be leased to those companies
was, I think, a very, very important thing.
And so we have the university then connecting with industry.
This just created a terrific atmosphere for entrepreneurship.
NARRATOR: By the time Shockley set up his laboratory,
a handful of other electronics firms--
Hewlett-Packard, Varian, Litton--
also operated in the valley,
as did the m*ssile systems division of Lockheed Aircraft.
Here and there, the agricultural landscape
already was beginning to give way
to suburban subdivisions and large industrial structures.
And as they had more than a century earlier
during the Gold Rush, Americans were heading to California
in ever-increasing numbers--
some , a month in the late s--
in search of opportunity.
COHEN: People came to California to get started again
in their lives in new directions.
The idea of the new is a very exciting thing for Californians.
You're not as limited to what has gone before.
NARRATOR: For Shockley and the other entrepreneurs in the valley,
there was the genuine feeling of starting something from scratch.
REGIS McKENNA: This was pretty much a technological wilderness
when they came here.
Like the early pioneers that moved west,
they somehow struck out without really knowing
what the outcomes were going to be.
NARRATOR: Like many of the new arrivals,
William Shockley had made his name in the East.
One of the most legendary applied physicists
in the history of science,
he had spent much of his career at Bell Telephone Laboratories,
the renowned private research and development firm
in New Jersey.
It was there, in , that he had become famous
as one of the inventors of a tiny electronic device
known as a transistor.
It's a transistor, no bigger than a kernel of corn.
MALONE: The transistor is a turning point in technology history--
and actually human history--
because it's taking an existing technology
and moving it into a whole new dimension.
NARRATOR: Since the s, most electronics--
everything from television sets to hearing A*DS--
had run on vacuum tubes.
They were behind the transmission
of telephone signals, radio and radar,
and also ran the world's first
electronic general-purpose computer,
which was built by the U.S. Army during World w*r II
and popularly known as a "Giant Brain."
MALONE: It was the fastest computation machine anyone had ever seen,
but it had one big problem: it was the size of a warehouse.
And these tubes consumed a lot of electricity,
and they used to joke that when you turned it on,
it dimmed the lights of the city around it.
And you had to have men run around inside the computer
changing tubes because they burned out pretty quickly.
NARRATOR: Vacuum tubes, like light bulbs,
worked by heating up a thin metal filament.
And, as with light bulbs,
the filament burned out from time to time,
requiring the tube to be replaced.
The transistor, by contrast, was virtually indestructible.
TED HOFF: The transistor represented
a major advance in being able to do electronic work
with far less power and a far smaller device.
NEWSREEL ANNOUNCER: What's inside the transistor?
Dr. Shockley shows us using a huge scale model.
Inside are two pins...
NARRATOR: The key to the transistor was a chemical element
known as a semiconductor.
In between materials like metals,
which conduct electricity easily,
and insulators such as rubber and glass,
which block electricity, a semiconductor could do both,
enabling it to act as an electrical switch.
By exploiting the properties of the semiconductor germanium,
Shockley and his colleagues had invented a device
with the potential to completely transform
the electronics industry.
One of the first hints of what was possible came in
with the transistor radio,
which was small enough to fit in a pocket.
[surf rock music playing]
The transistor radio quickly became
the most popular electronic communication device
the world had ever seen.
[surf rock music ends]
By , scientists and electrical engineers
all over the country were racing to develop new applications
for the transistor.
Shockley had more ambitious plans:
to exploit the commercial potential of the transistor
and make it the cornerstone
of a large and potentially lucrative new industry.
He decided to leave Bell Labs,
founded his own firm in California,
and began raiding Ph.D. programs and electronics companies
for gifted young recruits.
GORDON MOORE: He knew chemists had been useful to him at Bell Laboratories,
so he thought he needed one in his new operation,
and he got my name and gave me a call.
Fortunately, I recognized who it was.
I picked up the phone, he says, "Hello, this is Shockley."
LAST: He just showed up in my lab at MIT one day, and I thought,
"My God, I've never met anybody this brilliant."
I changed my whole career plans and said,
"I want to go to California and work with this man."
NARRATOR: Robert Noyce, then a -year-old research manager at Philco,
the Philadelphia-based electronics firm,
was equally impressed.
As he would later say of his phone conversation
with Shockley, "It was like talking to God."
Just over a month later, Noyce was headed out to California,
an interview at Shockley Laboratories scheduled
for the following morning.
MALONE: It was a chance for him to be
among the best and the brightest young scientists in America,
a chance to work with this acknowledged genius.
And Shockley was making noises
about how he was going to transform
the electronics industry,
you know, with brilliant new inventions.
I mean how do you say no to something like that?
NARRATOR: Shockley touted his new team
as the "most outstanding in the semiconductor field"--
a dozen-and-a-half young scientists of various stripes--
physicists, electrical and mechanical engineers,
metallurgists, tool builders,
all of them rising stars in the field,
all but a handful under the age of .
LAST: We were all about the same age,
and we had made scientific accomplishments
on our own before that.
We were very, very compatible with our scientific training
and with the way we looked on the world.
NARRATOR: There was Jay Last,
a Pennsylvania-born physicist with a doctorate from MIT;
chemist Gordon Moore, who had grown up in the farm country
north of the Santa Clara Valley but had spent the last two years
at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab;
Jean Hoerni, a theoretical physicist from Switzerland
with two doctoral degrees
and a glowing employment recommendation from Cal Tech;
and Robert Noyce, a native of Iowa with a Ph.D. from MIT
and the Shockley team's resident expert on transistors.
VICTOR JONES: There was no one there other than Bob Noyce
who was really well-grounded in semiconductors.
Gordon Moore, Jay Last and myself,
we used to get there at :
and try to teach ourselves semiconductor physics
for the first hour in the morning.
LAST: I had never seen a transistor
until I went to work for Shockley.
Bob knew and understood transistors very well.
And talking to him was a way of really learning
a lot of stuff very quickly.
NARRATOR: By coincidence, Noyce had been introduced to the transistor
soon after its development at Bell Labs.
He'd been an undergraduate at Iowa's Grinnell College then,
studying under Grant Gale, a physics professor
who just happened to have gone to college
with one of the transistor's inventors.
At Gale's request, Bell Labs sent over the technical reports
on the new device.
Noyce devoured them.
With the transistor, Noyce knew he was looking at the future.
"The concept hit me like the atom b*mb," he later recalled.
"It was one of those ideas that jolts you out of the rut,
gets you thinking in a different way."
LAST: The transistor was still a laboratory curiosity
at Bell Labs during that period.
MALONE: It somehow manages to get to Iowa
to a little liberal arts college in the middle of the country,
and sitting there in the class
is the man who's going to make it all happen.
The odds are astronomical of any of this occurring.
NARRATOR: Noyce went on to study transistor-related technology
at MIT, then took the job with Philco
in its newly formed transistor division.
Bright and personable, he was quickly promoted to manager,
and just as quickly came to the conclusion
that the bureaucracy of East Coast corporations
did not suit him.
McKENNA: Places like Philco, and Bell Labs, and IBM--
they were very large, hierarchical kinds of companies
and businesses.
And it was very structured.
Philco was so structured that your status and your furniture
was determined by a book that actually had your title
and your position in the company
and what sort of furniture you were allowed to have
in your office at that time.
And so everything was put in a rulebook of some kind.
It was very stifling and limiting in your own freedoms.
BERLIN: Noyce wanted to be a scientist--
to be in a lab all day every day.
He quickly discovered that he hated management.
He had imagined himself as an independent operator.
ROBERT NOYCE: Philco was doing good work in transistors,
but Shockley was the top of the field.
And I wanted to see if I could compete with him, if you will.
I wanted to play in the big leagues.
NARRATOR: In California, Noyce would get his chance.
NARRATOR: In , Shockley Semiconductor had all the makings
of a success: solid financial backing
from a Southern California technology company,
Beckman Instruments, and a straightforward mandate--
build a commercially viable silicon transistor.
At that point, the standard semiconductor used
in transistors was germanium.
But germanium functioned poorly at high temperatures,
making it spectacularly ill-suited to meet the demands
of the burgeoning defense industry,
with its heat-producing missiles and planes.
The solution was to create a device built
from germanium's more stable, more heat-resistant cousin,
silicon.
But silicon was difficult to work with
and its conductivity hard to manipulate.
Shockley wanted to try a new method.
We were all going through a learning experience
with silicon and this new technology.
And we were making some progress
but there was still quite a long ways to go.
NARRATOR: Then, about six months into the project,
came news that Shockley had been awarded the Nobel Prize
along with two of his colleagues from Bell Labs
for inventing the transistor.
MOORE: We adjourned to salute the honor
with champagne starting at : in the morning
at a local restaurant.
NARRATOR: All of them would later mark that celebration
as the beginning of the end.
LAST: The whole atmosphere changed very quickly,
and... and it deteriorated very rapidly.
NARRATOR: Shockley's ego-- outsized to begin with--
now threatened to eclipse his genius.
He became rigid, authoritarian, impossible to please.
He began to show lots and lots of anger towards people
who weren't doing things
according to what he wanted to do.
NARRATOR: Without warning or explanation,
Shockley demanded that much of his team shift its focus
from the silicon transistor to a complicated new device
called a four-layer diode.
MOORE: Bob Noyce and I wrote a pretty strong memo to him
as to why the transistor was where he ought
to continue to work, but it didn't seem to have
any significant impact.
LAST: This four-layer diode wasn't coming along very fast.
With the path we were on,
we were never going to have a commercial device.
He couldn't face up to the fact that he'd made a bad decision,
so he started blaming everybody around him.
He was very a*usive.
I went from being his fair-haired boy to being
one of the causes of all his problems.
It was very painful to me.
They knew how good they were,
and Shockley was treating them as if they were children.
They would come in with a great idea
and Shockley would get on the phone and call
one of his old colleagues at, you know, Bell Labs
and say, "What do you think?"
It must have been very, very difficult to be told every day
that you can't be trusted with your own ideas.
LAST: We'd go away for the weekend
and bemoan the problems we were getting into with Shockley,
and trying to understand why things had all of a sudden
gotten so difficult with the man.
NARRATOR: Eventually, seven of the company's top scientists
and engineers--
Jean Hoerni, Julius Blank, Victor Grinich, Eugene Kleiner,
Gordon Moore, C. Sheldon Roberts and Jay Last--
decided to take matters into their own hands.
They contacted Shockley's boss, Arnold Beckman,
and requested that Shockley be removed as manager.
MOORE: Beckman essentially told us,
"Shockley's the boss, take it or leave it."
We discovered a group of young Ph.D.s couldn't push aside
a new Nobel Prize winner very easily.
LAST: So we were just completely sandbagged,
and we realized then we had to leave.
We had really burned our bridges.
McKENNA: The business culture that existed in this country
was that you go to work for a company
and you stay with that company
and you retire with that company.
People did it at General Motors,
people did it at Ford Motor Company,
people did it at Philco.
This was what traditional East Coast--
and even Midwestern-- American values were.
MALONE: These guys all joined on the belief
that they would stay there forever.
And it really took the incredibly bad management skills
of Bill Shockley to alienate them so badly
that they would contemplate just, you know,
stepping out the front door into the abyss.
NARRATOR: Shortly after the attempted coup at Shockley,
a letter landed on the desk of Arthur Rock,
a financial analyst at the Wall Street investment firm
of Hayden Stone.
ROCK: The letter essentially said
that there were seven people connected
with Shockley Laboratories
who were thinking of leaving
and did we know any company that would like to hire them.
MOORE: Arthur Rock came out to meet with us.
He told us,
"What you really want to do is set up your own company,
and we will find you financing."
LAST: None of us really knew many details
of what was involved in running a company.
But it just looked like a very exciting direction to go.
NARRATOR: At that moment, Robert Noyce was not among the defectors.
But they all agreed the new venture needed him.
MOORE: Bob was the kind of person everybody liked
when they first met him.
He had that personality that came across very smoothly.
And, as such, it opened doors.
And, of course, he was brilliant, which helped.
NARRATOR: Thanks to his knowledge of transistors,
Noyce had been given some real authority in Shockley's lab,
and he was reluctant to walk away at first.
NOYCE: I felt that I had a commitment to Shockley,
and I wanted to do everything I could
to make that organization work.
And so I felt that my first obligation
was to try to talk those seven folks into not leaving.
When I failed in that, I felt that I should join them.
NARRATOR: Now they were eight.
LAST: Our real aim was to keep working together.
We knew we could build a transistor
that was going to be a very successful, innovative product.
MALONE: They've, in a sense, already rolled the dice in a big way
just being where they are.
You go to California, you leave your life behind,
you strike out to try something new and to start your life over.
And the job turns out to be a nightmare.
Now you get to the moment of decision--
are you going to roll the dice one more time?
NARRATOR: In New York, Arthur Rock was working the phones
in search of a backer.
ROCK: We made up a list of companies
that might be interested,
but none of them were willing to take on
a separate company division.
They felt that their own employees
would have problems with it,
that they would see it as a way that someone else made
a lot of money at their expense.
They just couldn't get it through their heads
that this was a good opportunity.
We had a couple of months of doing this
and were about to give up
when someone suggested that I see Sherman Fairchild.
NARRATOR: A prolific inventor and entrepreneur,
Sherman Fairchild was the owner
of Fairchild Camera and Instrument,
a New York-based manufacturer of aeronautic, electronic
and photographic products.
He was also the largest single stockholder in IBM,
the computing giant his father had co-founded.
ROCK: Sherman Fairchild was well known
and well respected and used to tinkering around with things.
And he immediately saw the potential in this.
LAST: Sherman Fairchild had the vision and the interest in us.
He was very rich, had a very great imagination
and enthusiasm for things.
And if it hadn't been for him,
I don't know if we would've found a sponsor.
NARRATOR: Fairchild readily agreed to put up $. million.
In exchange, he retained an option to buy out
the new subsidiary.
If Fairchild Semiconductor were successful,
the parent company was positioned to reap the benefits.
Shockley Laboratory was about to suffer an exodus of talent
from which it would never recover.
MOORE: Shockley was crushed.
He looked like a, a beaten puppy
as he walked out the door that day.
NARRATOR: With Shockley reeling,
Beckman issued a warning to the eight defectors.
BERLIN: They were told, "This is a shameful act.
"You need to consider the consequences.
"You have essentially turned traitor.
"You have broken what everyone knows is the contract
"that you make when you start working at a company,
"which is you're there forever.
"You've changed the rules of the game
and you're never going to live that down."
It looks easy nowadays because we have a tradition,
largely set in motion by those guys,
where it's accepted in this town.
You're better off to go out and start your own company and fail
than it is to stick at one company for years.
The real respect comes from going out there
and being an entrepreneur.
But that wasn't true in the s.
The cost of failure now is small.
The cost of failure back then was enormous.
It must have been scary as hell.
NEWSREEL ANNOUNCER: Today a new moon is in the sky,
a -inch metal sphere placed in orbit by a Russian rocket.
NARRATOR: The news stunned America.
On October , ,
the Soviet Union successfully launched <span tts:fontStyle="italic">Sputnik,</span>
the first space satellite,
dealing a powerful technological blow to the United States
and intensifying the anxieties of the Cold w*r.
McKENNA: There was this underlying fear that existed
that we were imminently going to be at w*r with Russia,
and that it was probably going to be a nuclear w*r.
Once they were able to demonstrate
that they could put a payload into space,
that said that probably we were
much more vulnerable as a country.
ROCK: The Russians had just beaten us at our own game,
and I think everyone in this country
was just befuddled by it.
How could this happen?
How could they beat us?
DOUGLAS EDWARDS: The course of United States policies
in the competition with Russia has been severely shaken.
This is Douglas Edwards.
Good evening.
JACK YELVERTON: <span tts:fontStyle="italic"> Sputnik</span>caught the attention of everybody.
All of a sudden there was a real recognition
that we needed to be a more technically oriented society.
NARRATOR: In the wake of the <span tts:fontStyle="italic">Sputnik</span> launch,
President Eisenhower signed
the National Aeronautics and Space Act, establishing NASA.
The agency began operations in October ;
within two years, its budget would top $ million a year.
For recently incorporated Fairchild Semiconductor,
the nation's new obsession with technology
would prove the business opportunity of a lifetime.
The space race is on
and the federal government suddenly has an insatiable need
for precisely what these guys are going to start building.
NARRATOR: Fairchild Semiconductor--
soon-to-be manufacturer of silicon transistors--
set up shop just down the road from Shockley,
renting out a concrete slab of a building
that amounted to little more than walls and a roof.
MOORE: At Fairchild, we had a clean slate.
We had an empty building and we could do it
the way we now thought was the right way to do it.
LAST: The building had no electricity, phones, water.
We didn't have any toilets.
We had to go to the gas station down the street.
A main topic of discussion always was,
"How soon are we gonna get the power and be able to start in?"
YELVERTON: There were challenges and problems everywhere.
You had to build the equipment
that you needed to make these transistors.
It was a whole brand-new world
that nobody had been there before.
LAST: We had the basic technology,
but all of the details we had to do ourselves
and invent ourselves.
I remember the group of us
cleaned up the floor and said,
"All right, now we're in business."
NARRATOR: Fairchild Semiconductor had barely opened its doors
when the team got wind of a potential sales opportunity.
The Air Force had hired IBM to build a navigational computer
for the new supersonic B- b*mber.
What the military needed was silicon transistors
that were not only capable of withstanding high temperatures,
but also fast switching.
The most likely supplier
was the largest semiconductor manufacturer in the country,
Texas Instruments-- or TI--
but the silicon devices TI was making were too slow.
IBM invited the upstart Fairchild
to bid on the contract.
A meeting was set up at IBM's Federal Systems Division
in Owego, New York.
For the Fairchild founders,
there was no question that Robert Noyce would be the one
to make their pitch.
YELVERTON: Bob had the ability to charm anybody.
He had a great smile, he had a quick wit.
And when he walked into a room,
people would sit up and pay attention.
BERLIN: Fairchild at this point was three months old,
in talks with IBM, one of the great companies in the country.
NARRATOR: The device the military wanted
pushed the bounds of existing technology.
To date, no electronics company had built a single one.
IBM needed a sample batch of a hundred.
IBM laid out the specification they needed.
And they turned to Bob.
BERLIN: One would expect that Noyce might be
a little bit quaking in his boots when he hears,
"Well, the only way you can get this contract
is if you can build a hundred of these."
SPORCK: Bob's thinking about it and he says,
"Yeah, we could do that."
Now, you understand, they hadn't made...
they hadn't built this transistor yet.
NARRATOR: Noyce's confidence won Fairchild the contract--
and the fledgling company's chemists and engineers
went to work.
They had already decided to split into two R&D teams,
and now, under intense deadline pressure,
they were racing against one another
to develop a transistor that met IBM's specs.
It took five months, but in July ,
Fairchild fulfilled its first order:
silicon transistors at $ each--
times the going rate for the less-sturdy germanium standard.
LAST: We hadn't thought about how you shipped the device.
So I went down to the supermarket
and got a Brillo box.
And the first product went to IBM in a Brillo box.
When IBM starts buying your transistors and using them
in their equipment,
that tells the rest of the world that you've got something.
LAST: When I look back on it now, I'm just flabbergasted
that we did what we did.
We took the basic Bell Labs technology
and turned it into a product that nobody in the world
had ever made before.
We went to our first trade show,
and we got an enormous reception.
NARRATOR: As a triumphant Noyce put it to the Fairchild staff,
"We scooped the industry."
NOYCE: I grew up in small-town America, which had to be self-sufficient.
If something was broke, you fix it yourself.
We didn't have the expertise around,
so we all had to be experts.
MALONE: Noyce comes from a generation
that we won't see again in the electronics industry.
These are people that grew up in a world without electronics.
Where they got their technical chops, it's almost magical.
Dad may have bought a ham radio,
they may have had an affinity
to working on equipment on a farm.
But what's interesting about them is they all share
those sort of middle-American values.
They were basically honest, they were as good as a handshake.
There was a constant tension
between being masters of the universe
and living in small-town life.
That tension drove these guys on.
NARRATOR: Right out of the gate,
Fairchild Semiconductor had managed to capture
the industry's attention.
But building a cutting-edge transistor
was only half the battle.
The key to success was being able to mass-produce it.
LAST: Our main goal was just figuring how to make
a lot of these things-- reliably and in short order.
SPORCK: When you're building an automobile,
% of the time the car comes out.
When you're building semiconductors,
sometimes a chip comes out that works.
Frequently, nothing comes out.
MALONE: Chip yields--
the amount of chips that actually worked
when they came off the line--
were going up and down unpredictably.
There are stories where they discovered it was because
there were farm fields outside,
and whenever they put down pesticide,
it would affect the yields on chips.
The yield would change with the water level in the ground.
If men didn't wash their hands after going to the bathroom,
the uric acid crystals would wipe out hundreds of chips.
It was an incredibly crude process.
NARRATOR: The select few working transistors had to be mounted,
connected to lead wires, and put in casings--
a delicate, labor-intensive task
performed almost exclusively by women.
YELVERTON: It was just a given in the industry at that time.
The belief was that women were used to doing needlework
and working closely with their hands,
and they had better hand-eye coordination.
GINGER JENKINS: It was all manual dexterity.
My starting job at Fairchild was called a die-attacher.
A die is a tiny little silicon chip.
I attached them to the package,
with the gold layer under the silicon piece.
And then after I was done it would go to the bonder,
who would attach little wires to it.
LAST: When our devices came along,
there was an instant acceptance of them.
It was the ideal component--
the small size and weight, the high performance,
the ability to perform
under very high temperature requirements.
The only thing we had to figure out to do,
we knew they had to be reliable.
NARRATOR: The reliability of Fairchild's product was put to the test
in , when the upstart company beat out
its more established rival, Texas Instruments,
to supply transistors for the guidance system
on the Minuteman nuclear ballistic m*ssile.
SPORCK: The Minuteman program was a godsend for us.
The military was willing to pay high prices for performance.
How does the small company
compete against the giant TI or Motorola?
It has to have something unique.
And then it has to have an outlet.
Certainly the military market was very important for us.
NARRATOR: For the military, reliability was essential,
and the first Fairchild transistors did not measure up.
An alarming number of devices
had to be returned to the company
for so-called "random catastrophic failure."
Lab tests revealed that it took nothing more
than a sharp tap with a pencil
to make the transistor stop working altogether.
LAST: Here we had the product that scooped the industry,
and all of a sudden we didn't have a reliable product.
We realized that when we were sealing these up,
little specks of metal would be loose inside the can
and short out the device sometimes.
We were really running scared.
It would have been the end of the company.
We needed to solve the problem.
NARRATOR: For more than a year, physicist Jean Hoerni
had been working on a radically new transistor design:
a thin, protective layer of silicon oxide
mounted on top of the transistor.
Now, he and Noyce believed its time had come.
The concept moved quickly from sketch to basic component,
and then was rigorously tested and refined.
In a nod to its flat top,
Fairchild dubbed Hoerni's innovation the "planar process."
The method not only solved the reliability problem,
it actually improved
the transistor's overall performance.
YELVERTON: The planar process was a major step forward
in the ability to make silicon transistors.
Using the planar process,
you had a very clean and more highly reliable transistor.
You could increase your yields, you could reduce your costs
and make a much better product.
NARRATOR: Fairchild immediately took out a patent.
SPORCK: With the planar process, all hell broke loose.
Everybody else had to come to our door
and plead with us to get a license.
NARRATOR: As orders began pouring in, Fairchild Camera and Instrument
decided to exercise its option to buy its upstart subsidiary.
Each of the eight co-founders of Fairchild Semiconductor
received stock options worth almost $,--
roughly $ million today.
"The money doesn't seem real," Noyce told his father.
"It's just a way of keeping score."
MALONE: If you look close enough at history,
most inventions are not out of the blue.
They tend to arise out of a milieu
where the time for that invention has come.
In the late s, we had the transistor.
It's now being sold in the millions.
It's got one problem: it's a discrete device.
It does one thing,
and if you want to do two things,
you have to have two of them.
And if you want to build a big computer
that does , things,
you've got to have , transistors.
BERLIN: The more of these discrete components,
the number of connections between them
grows exponentially.
So you could end up in a situation
where you could have all of the independent components
testing out as working,
and you could have the circuit fail
because the connections between the components were failing.
So there were efforts all over the country,
people trying to figure out, "How can we somehow,
"at the same time that we build these components,
how can we also connect them to each other in a single device?"
Military might depended on being able to build
these rockets and missiles,
and so the Department of Defense
was willing to pay almost anything
for a lightweight, reliable circuit.
NARRATOR: The answer, when it came, caught Fairchild off-guard.
In March , at an industry trade show in New York,
Texas Instruments announced that it had patented
an entire circuit on a single semiconductor chip,
effectively trouncing the competition.
Designed the previous fall by an engineer named Jack Kilby,
TI's so-called "solid circuit" spurred Fairchild to action.
"We were working day to day," Noyce recalled,
"to try and get a competitive edge."
JERRY SANDERS: At the time,
TI was the biggest company in the world in semiconductors.
Fairchild was just a, you know, peanut,
and wanted to beat TI.
I was at an industry show,
and I ran into a manager from Texas Instruments.
I walked up to him and shook his hand,
or tried to shake his hand.
He looked at me like, you know, I was garbage,
and said, I'll never forget it,
"Fairchild, we're gonna crush you guys."
And I thought, "Wow!
That is really weird!"
So there was just a lot of hysteria
against, you know, Fairchild as it was making its way.
NARRATOR: As head of R&D, Robert Noyce had been thinking
about ways to connect components for some time.
In fact, two months before TI's announcement,
he'd sketched some ideas in his lab notebook
for a device that would come to be called
"the integrated circuit."
LES VADASZ: The integrated circuit idea is that,
hey, you don't have to have individual devices.
You can have all these devices in one piece of silicon
and interconnect them right on that silicon chip.
NARRATOR: Building on Fairchild's planar process,
Noyce's design linked individual components together
with tiny metal lines
printed right on the protective oxide layer.
Kilby's design, by contrast, relied on thin gold wire
painstakingly threaded between the components by hand.
SANDERS: Jack Kilby just wired them together.
Bob Noyce said, "No wires."
In no way do I want to demean Jack Kilby's work.
I mean, you know, it was fantastic.
But it wouldn't have been practical for mass production.
ROGER BOROVOY: I've worked with a lot of brilliant people in my career
and, uh, he is at the top.
He had a way of integrating facts
and coming up with something you'd never expect.
NARRATOR: Now, jolted by TI's news,
Noyce hurriedly resurrected his notebook sketches.
LAST: Bob and I got together and said,
"We have to show the flag somehow."
So I made some crude devices
that we had at one of the trade shows.
NARRATOR: Noyce filed a patent for his integrated circuit in July .
By then, he'd been promoted to general manager
of Fairchild Semiconductor,
and with his new authority,
he put physicist Jay Last to the task of figuring out
how to build a commercial device.
VADASZ: The devil is in the detail.
The concept is one thing;
the other thing is to make it work
in a manufacturing environment
where you can just turn out millions and millions of them.
NARRATOR: It took two years, but in March ,
Fairchild introduced its first commercial integrated circuit,
called Micrologic.
At $, Micrologic was far out of reach
for the average private company.
But when President John F. Kennedy
announced an ambitious new space program in May,
it was clear that the federal government
would be willing to pay for it.
KENNEDY: These are extraordinary times,
and we face an extraordinary challenge.
I believe that this nation should commit itself
to achieving the goal, before this decade is out,
of landing a man on the moon
and returning him safely to the earth.
NARRATOR: At a time when the average computer
was a room-sized machine
containing mile upon tangled mile of wires,
Fairchild's integrated circuit, or microchip,
made it possible to put a computer
right on board a spacecraft
and send it all the way to the moon.
YELVERTON: This was one of those
really important disruptive technologies,
that this was something that was going to change everything
in electronics.
[expl*si*n]
BERLIN: Brilliant people with brilliant ideas exist all the time;
it's just a question of being a brilliant person
with a brilliant idea
in the right place at the right time,
where people want what you've come up with.
NARRATOR: Fairchild landed the contract
to supply chips for NASA's Apollo Guidance Computer.
Meanwhile, other semiconductor manufacturers
began to license Fairchild's technology
and build integrated circuits based on the planar process.
By , Fairchild Camera and Instrument
was reporting the highest sales and earnings in its history,
and rival Texas Instruments was crying foul.
TI filed suit against Fairchild for patent interference,
claiming ownership of the integrated circuit concept.
BOROVOY: Texas Instruments said, "We think we invented that."
Kilby certainly was first,
but Kilby's circuit was not a practical one.
MALONE: This is one of those cases of simultaneous invention.
Kilby has time precedence,
but Noyce's design is the one that worked.
NARRATOR: The suit would drag on for years.
In the end, Fairchild and Texas Instruments
would agree to share licensing of the integrated circuit.
By that time, TI itself was building microchips
based on Fairchild's planar process technology.
HADLEY: I was driving down ,
and at the side of the road
there was a large billboard with a sun rising,
and it said something to the effect that
Santa Clara County has more Ph.D.s in high technology
than any place in the world.
And a light went off, it was an epiphany,
and I said, "That's it, I'm going to go into high tech."
NARRATOR: Throughout the early s, thousands of young men and women
poured into the Santa Clara Valley every month,
lured by the booming electronics and defense industries.
And though each passing year
brought new companies into being--
and with them, new jobs--
Fairchild Semiconductor was one of the valley's biggest draws.
VADASZ: I was working at Transitron,
and I really wanted to come to Fairchild
because at that time, that's where things were happening.
SANDERS: The technology at Fairchild blew me away.
To see what they were doing at Fairchild when I went there,
I was in awe.
These were the smartest people I'd ever met.
NARRATOR: Critical to Fairchild's appeal
was the unique corporate culture that Robert Noyce encouraged.
YELVERTON: Bob had a very good idea
of how the company should behave as a company.
He had some pretty egalitarian ideas;
he wanted to break down the distinctions
between management and workforce.
McKENNA: Bob managed by camaraderie.
He believed in teamwork,
and to him everybody at Fairchild was part of the team.
HADLEY: It's what you could contribute that really counted the most.
Everybody was highly competitive to do the best in their job,
to make their company the best.
Why would we work ten-, -hour days?
It wasn't because somebody told us we had to.
We wanted to.
SPORCK: We were bullish about where the electronics were going to go.
We did not have any hesitation about unlimited growth forever.
MALONE: The atmosphere of the early Fairchild
was a combination of a college dormitory or frat house
with sort of like a country club locker room.
It was basically a bunch of men in their s
starting to make real money
competing with each other on who had the bigger swagger.
It either had to settle down and just become another company,
or it had to blow up.
It was just too volatile.
It was just too much talent stuffed into one place.
NARRATOR: Even as it enjoyed its meteoric rise,
Fairchild Semiconductor
was beginning to unravel at its core.
By , fully half of the founding team--
including Jay Last and Jean Hoerni,
as well as numerous researchers and engineers--
had left the company to start new ventures,
most of them positioning themselves as direct competitors
for the integrated circuit market.
GEORGE MOORE: It just exploded.
Every time we came up with a new idea,
we spawned two or three companies to try to exploit it.
NARRATOR: Over the next two decades,
Fairchild would spin off more than new firms,
including Rheem, Signetics, Molectro, Amelco,
General Microelectronics, Advanced Micro Devices.
In the Santa Clara Valley, they were known as "Fairchildren."
McKENNA: There was constant startups.
Almost every company had employees
coming out of Fairchild.
They were educating people in this new era of silicon.
As people began to develop their skills and knowledge,
the whole idea of venture capital
also was starting to grow and prosper.
You knew how to build a product, because you were doing it.
It was strictly a matter of finding the money
and taking the risk.
MALONE: In the 's at Fairchild,
everybody looks out there and says,
"Why are we sitting in the big city?
"We should be out there panning for gold.
Let's go start our own chip company."
Fairchild was like a seedpod,
and it just scattered new companies all over this valley.
And that's what really began
what we think of as the modern Silicon Valley.
NARRATOR: By the mid-'s,
Fairchild Semiconductor was raking in massive profits
for parent Fairchild Camera and Instrument.
In its first seven years, the semiconductor division
had opened nine new manufacturing plants,
including one in Hong Kong.
And at a time when NASA was buying
% of the integrated circuits produced in the United States,
Fairchild was a major supplier, shipping some , devices
for the Apollo space program in alone.
Robert Noyce wasn't satisfied.
It was all well and good to put Fairchild's microchips
at the disposal of American astronauts,
but Noyce's real target was the American consumer.
BERLIN: Noyce and his colleagues
saw an expanse open in front of them,
a world where electronics
were getting faster and smaller and cheaper,
and this could mean anything.
Noyce just had this notion
that this little thing that he had helped to invent
was going to change the world.
NARRATOR: In the spring of ,
Noyce made an announcement at an industry convention
that stunned even his staff:
Fairchild was slashing the price
of its most popular integrated circuit.
The microchips would sell for just a dollar apiece,
less than what it cost a manufacturer
to buy the components and assemble them.
What alarmed Noyce's team was that the price
was also less than it cost Fairchild to make them.
YELVERTON: There's a principle
that is pretty consistent in the electronics business
that the first product that you make
is very, very expensive,
and each additional unit that you make
brings the cost down just a little bit.
MOORE: Bob was taking a risk that made us all gulp at the time,
but it turned out to be the proper solution.
NARRATOR: As Noyce expected, demand soared,
production costs plummeted, and before long,
Fairchild was turning a healthy profit on commercial sales.
VADASZ: Bob Noyce always looked forward.
I think he was confident with risk.
McKENNA: Leaders break the rules.
That's what they do.
And I think he understood that principle,
that whole cultural attitude of pushing the edges,
of pushing the technology to where it's innovative
and thinking about things that people hadn't thought before.
HADLEY: It was exciting.
You know, our hearts and passions were really in our job.
And we knew that this was a force
that was just changing everything.
NARRATOR: Maybe it was the thrill
that came from always hovering on the edge of discovery.
Maybe it had to do with being on the literal edge of the country
and a continent away from the old rules.
But by the mid-s, the Santa Clara Valley
was about as charged a place
as any physicist or engineer could ever hope to find.
MALONE: We talk about the early era
of Silicon Valley
as being cowboys and Indians and the Wild West show,
and it really was.
SANDERS: It was a wild time.
People just drank too much.
I just remember that three gin and tonics
should have been my limit.
And the bar of choice was the Wagon Wheel.
SPORCK: We just got in the habit of going over there
for a beer on the way home.
Sometimes it was more than one.
HADLEY: It was very, very crowded.
Everybody from presidents and CEOs down to line workers,
and everything in between.
SPORCK: It got to be a hangout not just for Fairchild people,
but the spinoffs from Fairchild.
I mean, we all worked together, even though we were competitors.
We'd go in there and everybody was bragging about,
"I took that job away from you down there at Hughes," you know.
"You guys had it and I took it away."
I mean, it was just a marvelous environment of young guys
having a good time competing with each other.
SANDERS: Conversations were just rampant
about the latest sputtering device
or the latest piece of epitaxial equipment.
It was almost like a salon,
you know, everybody talking about what was going on,
who was working where, who was doing what.
JENKINS: You could make friends or lose friends at the Wagon Wheel.
I mean, it was a hub of networking.
SPORCK: There were always
a lot of girls from the factory there too,
which is not all good.
HADLEY: There was a lot of hanky-panky going on.
I remember thinking that the divorce rate
was probably %, not just %,
because a lot of the second marriages didn't make it either.
SANDERS: We just all were very excited about building our business,
building an industry.
So there was a sense that we're all in it together.
What was good for one was good for all.
MALONE: Fairchild was one of a kind.
They were hugely talented, they were first in,
and they moved really, really fast.
Motorola was chasing them,
Texas Instruments was chasing them,
the big companies like IBM with their microelectronics units
were chasing them, and nobody could catch Fairchild
because they were just so creative and so brilliant.
But they were destined at some point to stumble,
and the moment they stumbled,
everybody ran right over the top of them.
[bells ringing]
NARRATOR: In , Fairchild Camera's stock
rose faster than any other on the New York Stock Exchange.
"All the excitement," <span tts:fontStyle="italic"> Time</span>magazine reported,
"is over one division, the Semiconductor branch."
YELVERTON: Fairchild Semiconductor
really became the tail that wagged the dog.
It produced most of the profits
and all of the growth for Fairchild Camera.
NARRATOR: Increasingly, success bred discontent
and a simmering resentment
toward Fairchild's parent company.
At the top of the list of complaints
was the fact that semiconductor profits
did not get reinvested in the division's growth.
SANDERS: As a result, companies like Texas Instruments particularly
were catching up with Fairchild technology.
As was Motorola, they were catching up.
And so, with less funding for R&D
and less funding for new plants and equipment,
it was frustrating.
MALONE: These guys on the West Coast,
they're looking at millions and millions of dollars being made,
metaphorically being put into a Brinks truck and driven east,
and they're not getting a piece of their success.
NARRATOR: For Noyce, it was a source of deep frustration.
He had the power to direct the semiconductor division
and the responsibility for its performance,
but no ability to reward his staff.
YELVERTON: We tried very hard to get Fairchild
to think in terms of using more creative compensation,
including the idea of a stock option program.
They thought we were a bunch of dreamy-eyed socialists.
NARRATOR: Worst of all, in-fighting and a lack of communication
between the R&D and manufacturing departments
left the company scrambling to fulfill its orders.
ANDY GROVE: The research lab and the manufacturing location
were seven miles apart.
Those seven miles, from the standpoint of collaboration,
could have been , miles.
BOROVOY: Things were not good.
The company was floundering; products were very, very late.
Bob was not a day-to-day manager
by any stretch of the imagination.
He knew that was not what he did well.
GROVE: I had nothing but unpleasant, discouraging dealings with him
as I watched Bob manage a troubled company.
MALONE: I think one of the problems Fairchild got into
was Noyce trusted people maybe too much,
so that the company oftentimes became unharmonious.
GROVE: If two people argued and we all looked to him for a decision,
he would put a pained look on his face
and maybe said something like,
"Maybe you should work that out."
More often he didn't say that, he just changed the subject.
SPORCK: Bob's biggest problem is he had great difficulty saying "no."
If two department heads had different opinions
as to what they wanted to do,
it was whoever was there last got the right decision,
because he always gave you a "yes."
NARRATOR: As the internal strife mounted and earnings plunged,
Fairchild began to splinter.
In March , Noyce's right-hand man, Charlie Sporck,
announced that he was leaving to head up a competitor:
National Semiconductor.
MALONE: That stunned Fairchild.
And when Sporck left and went to National,
he began to raid Fairchild for talent,
and these guys all started going to National
and they were all getting stock options.
And they were succeeding.
That was the real eye-opener.
SPORCK: You're not completely pleased with the corporate office,
and you got these guys leaving and starting companies,
and the companies are running, working.
You get a look around and look in the mirror and say,
"Well, you know, how about you?
What are you gonna do?"
I know now that Bob was thinking the same thing.
NARRATOR: Gordon Moore, chemist and director of the R&D department,
was the first to hear of Noyce's plans.
MOORE: Bob came to me and said, "How about starting a new company?"
Well, my first reaction was, "Nah, I like it here."
And then a couple of months later he came back and said,
"I'm leaving.
How would you like to start a new company?"
Which put a whole different light on the thing.
NARRATOR: Noyce and Moore resigned from Fairchild in the summer of .
Noyce was , Moore, .
As Noyce put it in a letter to Sherman Fairchild,
his aim was to "get close to advanced technology again"
and to enjoy "more personal creative work
"in building a new product, a new technology
and a new organization."
MALONE: The history of Silicon Valley is people going to startups,
leaving really nice jobs that pay really well,
and taking this gigantic leap
to see if they can make something important happen,
be valuable, and in the long run maybe even get rich.
Noyce is the prototype of that.
The Noyces of the world didn't get into this to have a job.
They got into this to create a reality
and to be in control of that reality,
even if it meant giving everything up
and starting from scratch.
[faint voices over radio]
NARRATOR: The images captivated the world.
On July , ,
years after the Russians had shamed America with <span tts:fontStyle="italic">Sputnik</span>
and just eight after President Kennedy
had challenged the nation to go to the moon,
there was astronaut Neil Armstrong,
stepping onto the lunar surface.
ARMSTRONG: That's one small step for man...
NARRATOR: The scale of the achievement was obvious.
What was less apparent to the half a billion people watching
was that the success of Apollo
had hinged on the integrated circuit technology
invented by Fairchild.
SPORCK: At the time of the moon landing, I was in Paris on a sales trip,
and all of the TV stores had the TVs on,
and there were pictures of the Americans on the moon.
It was a very great, patriotic feeling
as well as a feeling
that it's our technology that's doing that.
It was a good deal.
[crowd cheering]
MALONE: really is that miracle year
in th century American history.
It's the moon landing; it's Woodstock.
[guitar solo playing]
At the time we thought, "Wow, these are epochal events
taking place around us and we're here for it."
And even while they were battling over People's Park
and rioting in the streets in San Francisco
and protests at Stanford,
what we weren't noticing just a few miles away
were the guys sitting in laboratories
inventing stuff that really did change the world
and will continue to change the world for centuries to come.
NARRATOR: By the time of the moon walk,
Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore had been in business a year.
Starting up had been a breeze.
With their legendary status in the industry,
they'd easily secured financing,
raising $. million in less than two days.
They'd also managed to lure many of the best and brightest,
among them Andy Grove,
a Hungarian-born chemical engineer
who had joined Fairchild's R&D division in .
Now, he would serve alongside Noyce and Moore
as the new venture's director of operations.
GROVE: Bob didn't know me well enough to have a real opinion.
But Bob trusted Gordon,
and Gordon thought I was pretty good.
MALONE: The smartest hiring I think Bob ever did in his life
was hiring Andy Grove,
because as good as the fit was between Noyce and Moore,
there was one thing lacking,
and that was that drive to make the company function
at its highest capability on a day-to-day basis.
Neither one of those guys was tough enough for that job.
ANN BOWERS: Andy was the guy who made sure the trains all ran on time.
He was a taskmaster.
He had very strong views about what you should do
and what you shouldn't do,
and he was very direct about that.
NARRATOR: They'd called their new company "Intel,"
an abbreviation of "integrated electronics,"
which also happened to conjure the word "intelligence."
McKENNA: It did not get a great deal of attention in the media,
but there was just a buzz, particularly here in the valley.
There was an expectation that they were going to do something
that was unique and different.
NARRATOR: Believing computers to be the future
of the semiconductor industry,
Noyce and Moore had decided to produce memory devices
and to challenge the dominant technology,
magnetic core memory,
with a product based on Noyce's integrated circuit.
They'd given themselves two years to make a profit,
and the clock was ticking.
GROVE: I had horrible nightmares.
Do all this with a ragtag crew
that never worked with each other,
run by somebody who never ran things like this.
I never took a business course.
I was inventing what to do as we went along.
This was not easy.
NARRATOR: Those first years, Noyce would later say,
were like "walking the thin line next to the cliff of disaster."
Noyce found it exhilarating.
His mantra now was innovation, and everything about Intel
had been designed to encourage it,
from the companywide stock options
to the open-plan office.
MALONE: And I remember walking in at Intel headquarters,
and I couldn't find Noyce.
A secretary had to come out and lead me to his cubicle,
because his cubicle was almost indistinguishable
from all the other cubicles
in this vast prairie dog town of cubicles.
Here's the living legend,
but he looked like a middle manager
at a division of some Midwestern manufacturing company.
BOWERS: At Intel, there were no privileges anywhere.
We started a form of company culture
that was completely different than anything had been before.
You worked hard and delivered,
and that improved your life in a variety of ways.
It was a culture of meritocracy.
NARRATOR: For Noyce, Intel was an answer
to years of chafing at the strictures of corporate life,
from his experiences at Philco and Shockley Laboratories
to his dealings with Fairchild's parent company.
TED HOFF: The idea is people should not have to go up
through a chain of command.
If you need to talk to a particular manager,
you go to him and you talk to him.
To get away from the hierarchy
that was characteristic of really large corporations
where everything has to be done, you know,
in a very rigid manner.
That very democratic society was something that Bob promoted.
And then Andy found a way to keep it,
but keep it with discipline.
MALONE: The guys at the top, especially Noyce,
trusted the wisdom of all the employees in the company.
In their minds, innovation could come from anywhere,
and they were open to it coming from everywhere.
NARRATOR: In the spring of , as Intel engineers
continued to tinker with the design of their memory chip,
the fledgling company scored a contract
that would alter its course.
The Japanese firm Busicom hired Intel
to design specialized microchips
for its new calculator,
and almost immediately,
a young engineer named Ted Hoff raised a red flag.
HOFF: The more I learned about this design,
the more concerned I became that Intel may have undertaken
more than it was prepared to deliver.
The number of chips and their complexity
was much greater than I had expected.
And Bob said, "Well, if there's anything you can think of
to simplify the design, why don't you pursue it?"
BERLIN: Noyce always encouraged
the people in his labs to run with their ideas
and see where they went.
NARRATOR: Hoff's concept was radical; he envisioned a single chip
that could be programmed for a specific application--
in this instance, to function as a calculator.
Noyce saw the potential for much more.
With Hoff's chip, the guts of a computer--
a machine that in
was still more or less the size of a refrigerator--
could be shrunk down to fit on a fingertip.
With a push from Noyce, Hoff's invention would lead directly
to the world's first microprocessor: Intel's .
Introduced in
and containing more than , transistors,
the device was advertised as a "computer on a chip."
The digital revolution had officially begun.
SANDERS: Probably the most important invention
of the last hundred years was the microprocessor,
which is basically the fundamental driving force
and brain of all of the digital equipment we use today.
Whether it's an iPhone, a computer, you know,
a notebook, you know, a tablet,
whatever it is, basically it's built around a microprocessor.
MALONE: That's the defining product of the modern world.
There's never been a proliferation
of a new technology that fast in human history.
MOORE: It's been successful beyond anything
we possibly could have imagined in the beginning.
And the result has really revolutionized
the way people live.
SANDERS: The microprocessor is now a $ billion industry
and underlies the entire information technology world.
The microprocessor, of course, is a collection of thousands,
hundreds of thousands, now millions of transistors.
There's no way that those would have been possible
without Bob Noyce's invention of the integrated circuit.
MALONE: I think you can credit Bob Noyce
for being the first technology entrepreneur CEO,
in the sense that he built a company
that was wholly dedicated
to being on the absolute cutting edge of technology, perpetually.
The zenith of that is probably Apple Computer
in the st century.
The prototype for that is Intel in the s and 's,
where you build a company that is purely technology driven.
You're not even sure what industries
you're going to be building for after a certain point.
You're just driving the technology forward
at breakneck pace
and seeing what emerges from it all
and then coping with it.
It's a very, very interesting business model
that never existed before and really begins with Intel.
NARRATOR: By the time Intel introduced the microprocessor,
the Santa Clara Valley bore little resemblance
to the verdant farmland it had been years earlier
when William Shockley set up shop.
The number of high-technology jobs in the area
had increased tenfold since ,
and the population of San Jose, the valley's largest city,
had more than doubled to nearly half a million.
As consumer applications for the microprocessor
began to proliferate, venture capitalists rushed in,
gradually replacing the military and NASA
as the financial backbone of the industry.
No longer would the area be referred to
as the "Valley of Heart's Delight."
After -- that banner year for Intel--
it would increasingly be known as "Silicon Valley,"
a name soon to be synonymous with risk,
technological innovation
and a new brand of the American Dream.
MALONE: This valley is perpetually young.
It's always made up of the next generation
of bright young entrepreneurs showing up,
having their "k*lling Dad" moment
of the previous generation of valley executives,
and they start their own companies.
We're not real big on history around here.
We don't look back very much.
SANDERS: In Silicon Valley, innovation is everything.
How are you different?
How are you better?
The rest of it is gut-busting, hardworking engineering.
But the idea to do something so different...
that's the magic of Silicon Valley then and now.
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Silicon Valley (1988)
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