Pearl Harbor: Through the Eyes of Japan (2025)

[bunniefuu]

- In the silence of a quiet Sunday morning

in December of 1941,

many young men on the island of Oahu

have just made it to church.

Others are waking up

and getting dressed for a

beautiful day in paradise,

and still others,

thousands of Navy sailors,

are still asleep in their bunks.

Unbeknown to them,

180 Japanese aircraft have

just arrived over the island

and are now approaching

the United States' naval base

of Pearl Harbor from multiple directions.

In just a few moments, the

opening shots of World w*r II

for both Japan and the United

States are about to be fired,

and the results would be catastrophic

for the American fleet at anchor.

This had been the result

of months of planning

by Japanese commanders,

and now, for the first time,

this iconic attack will be viewed

through the eyes of the aggressors,

the Japanese, who thrust the US

into the largest w*r in history.

From the perspective of

Imperial Japan's commanders,

admiral, and the pilots who flew it,

this is the attack on Pearl Harbor.

It is the fall of 1941,

four months before the

attack on Pearl Harbor.

Currently in Washington, D.C.,

Japanese representatives are

desperately trying to negotiate

some sort of peace deal

with the United States.

However, things are not going well.

The previous year, the United States,

along with other nations,

announced that they were

officially ceasing all sales

of iron ore, steel,

and most importantly, oil to Japan

in an effort to discourage their invasion

and occupation of China

and French Indochina.

This embargo, however, would

prove to be more devastating

to Japan than these nations

could've ever imagined.

Without these imports,

not only would Japan's

military come to a grinding halt,

but also her entire economy

in a span of just a few short years.

Appropriately, Japan tried

desperately to negotiate

with the United States,

specifically for oil sales,

but President Roosevelt

refused to give any ground.

In exchange for oil and

for the sanctions to be lifted,

he demanded that the Japanese pull out

of French Indochina and China.

In the Japanese military culture, however,

this was unthinkable.

They had just entered Indochina,

and the w*r was nearing an end in China.

To pull back now would make clear

that they had submitted

to the United States

and were running from battle,

an incredibly dishonorable outcome

for the forces of the Japanese Empire.

As the US made this

stance abundantly clear,

Japan saw where the situation was headed.

Representatives attempted

to continue peace talks in D.C.,

but as early as April of 1941,

the Imperial Japanese

Headquarters began preparing

for a potential w*r with

the Western powers.

Contrary to popular belief, however,

this was a w*r that many

in Japan did not want.

In Imperial Japan, there

were two main factions

of the military, the Army and the Navy,

and unlike many nations,

these two factions were fiercely divided

and always in competition with one another.

And in keeping with their

seemingly constant disagreements,

when the emperor and his

staff summoned both factions

to advise him on the potential

w*r outlook with America,

he received two very different answers.

The Army was led by

Prime Minister Hideki Tojo,

and was far more warmongering

than any other group.

The leaders within mostly

wanted a w*r with America,

and vastly overestimated

the capability of Imperial Japan

to wage w*r with the United States.

The Navy, however, was led

by much more restrained and logical minds.

The Minister of the Navy was a man

by the name of Koshiro Oikawa,

and he, unlike Tojo and

the w*r-hungry Army,

knew that Japan was not currently capable

of winning an all-out w*r with America,

and specifically, he was

well-aware of the fact

that the Japanese Navy

was not fully prepared

or armed enough to hold

off the American Pacific Fleet.

His restraint, however,

specifically in speaking his mind,

would prove to be costly.

As a man of traditional discipline,

he believed that it was not his position

as a military leader to decide when

and with whom to go to w*r.

That was instead the

job of the politicians,

and he was simply a military leader.

So unfortunately, one of

the only men whose insight

and opinion could have

indeed prevented the w*r

by stating the accurate outlook for Japan

and the unpreparedness

of her Navy was in fact silent

and reserved, as he

believed it was not his job

to speak on such matters.

Thus, the nation of Japan,

unless the peace talks

with the US were successful,

was well on her way to w*r,

and as such, a plan had to be made.

Despite its overconfident Army

and some leaders with

warmongering ambitions,

Japan and the rest of

the world was well-aware

that even in 1940

the United States of

America was a superpower.

Their economy was second to none,

and should they go to w*r

with their utmost strength

and on an even playing field,

they were nearly unbeatable.

We have thousands

- So it quickly became clear

that Japan would at all costs

try to ensure that this w*r was not fought

on an even playing field.

The best way to do this, without a doubt,

was a surprise attack, a

swift and unexpected blow

that would cr*pple the United States

while Japan immediately

engaged in an aggressive campaign

across the South Pacific to

take as many natural resources

as possible to fuel their

military and economy.

This would require a long and drawn-out w*r

by the United States to build back

and retake all of the territory.

This was not a w*r that

Imperial Japan believed

the American people

would be willing to wage.

But where and how

would this strike take place?

Perhaps a submarine strike

on the massive naval base

in San Francisco,

resulting in a crucial blow

at the mainland soil of the United States,

or perhaps Midway Island,

an Army invasion of a valuable airstrip

in the middle of the Pacific.

No, neither of these

would be the chosen target.

Instead, a man by the name of

Isoroku Yamamoto was already

well into the building of a plan

that would go down in history.

Yamamoto was currently

the most valuable man

in the entire Japanese Navy.

He had recently risen to prominence

for his keen strategic acumen

and his unwavering position against w*r.

In fact, he was one of the

last men that one would expect

to plan the ruthless surprise attack

against the United States,

as he had been firmly

against the invasion of China,

against the Tripartite

Pact with n*zi Germany

and Fascist Italy,

and was now also against

w*r with the United States.

If anyone would've had an

accurate grasp on the situation,

it should've been Yamamoto,

who, during his time in the United States,

had studied at Harvard and

had learned perfect English.

Due to these opinions,

Yamamoto had become a very

likely target for assassination

by the aggressive Japanese Army commanders,

who knew that he could try to prevent

the w*r that they wanted.

So Yamamoto was named Commander in Chief

of the Combined Naval

Fleet for the sole purpose

of protecting his life, as

naval commanders expected

that Yamamoto would

certainly be assassinated

had he remained on dry land.

During his time as commander

in chief of the naval fleet,

Isoroku Yamamoto had

innovated many important aspects

of the Imperial Navy,

but perhaps none so much as naval aviation.

Yamamoto was the greatest

advocate of naval air power

that Japan had ever seen.

Under his direction, the

Japanese naval aviation forces

had developed greatly in recent years,

and now, it was because of this

that a plan to strike Pearl

Harbor from the air was born.

The inspiration and

specific origins of the concept

for an attack on Hawaii

are actually unknown,

but what is apparent is that

Yamamoto was already planning

the concept out as early as January, 1941.

This sort of strike, however,

was completely revolutionary,

as naval aircraft had only

just recently reached a point

where they could legitimately

carry enough firepower

to execute an offensive strike

on an enemy fleet or base.

Thus, Yamamoto and the

Japanese Navy had to put together

a plan the likes of which had

never been before conceived.

Originally, when Yamamoto

assigned one of his staff members

to study an attack on Hawaii

and present him with the options,

there were three different attack concepts

that were considered.

The first was a strike utilizing

only Japanese dive bombers,

the most accurate and

most reliable for an attack

in a shallow water harbor such as this.

They would launch from

350 miles away at sea

and return back to the carriers.

This plan lacked fighter escort,

but was more of a hit-and-run concept,

targeting only the

American aircraft carriers

and then returning to the fleet.

The second idea was an interesting one,

as it also utilized only the

Japanese dive bombers,

but instead of launching at a

distance of 350 miles at sea,

the strike force would

be sent from farther out,

and immediately following their launch,

the Japanese carrier force

would turn back for Japan,

leaving the dive bombers

to land in the sea,

where they would later

be picked up by submarines.

This plan was essentially

the Japanese version

of the later to come Doolittle Raid,

a one-way strike from a carrier force

with the fleet immediately

turning away from the battle

to protect the carriers at all costs.

Then there was the third,

the most appealing, an all-out strike

utilizing dive bombers,

torpedo bombers, and fighters.

This plan had the most consensus

among naval staff members,

and if ex*cuted properly, would

ensure the most damage done

to the American fleet.

It was this plan that

they would build upon.

Meanwhile, Yamamoto

in Japan was still insisting

that the American economic

might would eventually win out

against the Imperial

Navy in a drawn-out w*r.

But nonetheless, if the

warmongering Army leaders insisted

on pushing his country into a w*r,

he felt that it was up to him to try

and give his empire the

best chance to succeed.

He wrote to a friend

expressing just this thought

right before the attack.

"A decision to go to w*r has been made

"that is diametrically

opposed to my attitude

"as an individual.

"There is no other choice

"but to pursue this course

with determination and energy.

"The current situation

is indeed strange for me.

"I suppose I should

regard it as my destiny."

As his destiny became clear,

training was now underway.

Yamamoto, who had threatened to resign

if the attack was not carried out

in the way that he demanded,

was now watching the

fighters practicing their strafing,

dive bombers striking targets at anchor,

and torpedo bombers attempting to hit ships

in a shallow harbor with

just 12 meters of depth.

This was thus far in naval

aviation an unheard of feat

in regards to an aerial torpedo.

It is because of this that the

US naval planners thought

that their fleet was safe

from aerial torpedo attack,

and thus did not utilize torpedo nets.

Fortunately for Yamamoto

and the Imperial Navy,

Japanese engineers had created a wooden fin

that allowed their torpedoes to not drop

to the normal depth

upon entry into the water.

But these fins are not

what you might think.

Looking at this new fin

as the Japanese train,

we can see the large

wooden fins on the back

of the Type 91 torpedo.

However, these are not the

special Pearl Harbor modification

as most people think.

These were added earlier

to ensure proper angle

upon entry into the water,

solving a separate problem

unrelated to that of Pearl Harbor.

These small little fins here

at the front of the tail cone

are actually the modification that was made

for the attack on Pearl Harbor,

and their impact is not made

after entry into the water,

but instead in the air.

These were gyroscopic anti-roll ailerons,

and their purpose was

to prevent the torpedo

from rolling in the air,

so that the horizontal

stabilizers on the back

could properly pitch the torpedo upwards

after entry into the water.

And tragically for the United States Navy,

this design worked flawlessly.

After rushing production,

these new torpedo

modifications would be delivered

to the carrier force

just a few days before

setting sail for Hawaii.

In Washington, D.C.,

peace talks had now

reached a breaking point.

Some historical perspectives

show the Japanese

as fully deceiving the United States

with false peace talks in

the lead-up to Pearl Harbor

or that the attack was a complete

and total surprise from a nation

that we were not in a

tense relationship with.

But these takes are not entirely true.

In reality, the Japanese envoy assigned

to reach an agreement was aggressively

still trying to negotiate peace,

and when they began to

fail, it was actually quite clear.

Here in "The New York Times,"

we can see a few articles from mid-November

that show the state of

the peace talks with the US

in the days leading up to

their deadline for a decision.

November 5th, "Japanese

Rushes Special Envoy to the U.S.

"with Last Proposals."

November 15th, "More

Japanese Representatives Arrive.

"Hoping for Peace."

And November 23rd, "US-Japan

Talks Now at Critical Point

"in Bids for Truce."

Now, remember, the decision point

for the Japanese attack

was in mid-November.

Thus, when a peace

agreement had not been reached

at this point, many of the moving parts

to the surprise attack

were already set into motion.

On November 26th, the

Japanese carrier fleet,

or Kido Butai, commanded

by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo,

set sail from Japan

and headed towards the

North Pacific on radio silence.

The force of six aircraft carriers

and more than 360

aircraft was fully prepped

and ready for w*r.

At the same time, we can

see things begin to unravel

as Japan accepts their fate.

US-Japanese peace talks have at this point

reached peak attention,

as they are continuously

making front page headlines.

November 27th, "US Gives

Terms to the Japanese,

"Plan Clings to Basic Principles,"

of pulling out of French

Indochina and China.

November 30th, things are now so serious

that the president ends his vacation early

to return to D.C. for final negotiations.

December 1st, less than

six days before the attack,

"Roosevelt Hurries Back in Crisis,"

sees Japanese envoy from Tokyo.

December 2nd, "Japan Renews Talks,

"But Capital is Skeptical,"

already showing the first signs

that they believe Japan is giving up.

And finally, on December 3rd,

we see that the US recognizes

troop buildups in key areas,

as the Japanese are

obviously planning to attack

various locations in the near future.

Now, Nagumo and the Kido Butai are

more than halfway across the Pacific,

nearing their launch point.

All the while, Japanese spies were sending

critical information back to Yamamoto

and his staff in Tokyo,

which as quickly as

possible was being relayed

to the admiral and his fleet.

In the days before the attack,

the Japanese spies reported

that there were no air balloons

preventing aerial attack,

as well as the fact that

eight or nine battleships were present

with a group in two

rows off of Ford Island.

This was key information,

because the Japanese

commanders were not positive

if the fleet would be

present in Pearl Harbor

or in another location that

had been used off of Maui.

While these reports did

provide priceless information,

they were not necessarily

the most accurate,

as they had to rely upon

minimally trained civilians

to identify US naval

vessels from long distances.

Thus, the reports also actually

incorrectly identified some ships.

For example, in the week

leading up to December 7th,

the number of aircraft carriers

reported in Pearl Harbor

were two by this spy,

but that was because he misidentified

the USS Utah as a carrier,

leaving only one, the USS

Lexington, still in the harbor

as the Japanese fleet approached.

But unfortunately, she would

also leave in the direction

of Midway to defend that crucial airfield

just before the attack,

similarly to the USS

Enterprise that had just left

to reinforce Wake Island a few days prior.

Thus, by December 7th,

there were no aircraft

carriers left in the harbor.

Unlike most portrayals,

while the Japanese did

hope to destroy three

or four carriers in the

original planning of the attack,

by the morning of the launch,

they knew that best case scenario,

there would only be one carrier present,

but even this was wishful thinking.

Regardless, the attack

still had to be carried out

to try and cr*pple the American Navy

before Japan went to w*r.

So as the Fleet of the

Rising Sun sailed towards

the rising sun on the

morning of December 7th,

one of the most important events

in history officially began.

The first event taking

place on the Kido Butai

in the early morning hours,

other than the launching of

the failed m*dget submarines

that made little impact on the attack,

would be the the sending

off of two seaplane scouts

to do reconnaissance over the harbor

and confirm that all

was clear for the strike.

These two seaplanes arrived

and confirmed the wind, cloud cover,

and location of the ships at Pearl.

Conditions were perfect,

and the order for the attack was given.

Despite the fact that their

suspicions were confirmed

and that no carriers were present,

a great deal of damage could still be done.

One seaplane returned back to the fleet,

and the other continued to

look for the missing carrier.

But the USS Enterprise,

currently on her way back from Wake Island,

would remain undiscovered.

In New York, thousands of miles away,

the Sunday morning paper

had already been delivered.

In it, there was no more front page mention

of the US and Japanese negotiations.

Ominously, far from the

headline at the bottom of page one,

would be a simple summary article titled,

"The International Situation."

The only mention of Japan

was President Roosevelt sending

one final message to Emperor Hirohito,

and that there have now

been suggestions from Tokyo

that Japan was on the verge of abandoning

diplomatic conversations

with the United States.

- This would be an understatement.

In reality, they were

on the verge of taking

more than 2,000 American

lives in a few short hours.

With the Kido Butai, the

first wave was now ready.

According to the attack

plans, the strike would consist

of three different attack waves.

The first, a group of 183 aircraft

were now being launched

from the six aircraft carriers.

Wave number one consisted

of 89 B5N Kate bombers,

40 fit with Type 91 torpedoes,

and 49 fit with 1,700-pound

armor-piercing bombs

for high-level bombing,

as well as 51 D3A Val dive bombers

with 550 pound bombs

for smaller targeted strikes,

as well as 43 A6M Zero fighters

for air control and strafing.

Still on radio silence, they

approached the Pacific Fleet

of the United States Navy

at anchor and mostly asleep.

Meanwhile, in Washington,

the Japanese peace talks'

representatives were attempting

to carry out their final assignment

just before the start of the attack.

In an effort to abide by the laws of w*r

in a symbolic and legalistic way,

the Japanese politicians

had decided to hand

the United States a declaration of w*r

just before the attack began.

This was despite the Imperial Army

and Navy not wanting to do so.

In fact, one of the only Navy

advocates that did demand

a declaration of w*r should

be given 30 minutes prior

was Admiral Yamamoto himself.

This, however, would fail to be ex*cuted.

The final message to the United States,

which was 5,000 words in length,

gave Japanese representatives

a hard time with decoding.

So its delivery was unintentionally delayed

until after the attack had already begun.

But it made little difference,

as American code breakers

had already intercepted

and decoded it long before the

Japanese representatives had.

So in some semblance,

the Japanese did attempt

to declare w*r just

before the attack began,

but it was a symbolic attempt,

and in the end would fail,

as the attack was already beginning.

At 7:40 a.m. Hawaii Time,

the massive flight of

Japanese aircraft finally began

to arrive at the island of Oahu.

In charge of the entire

aerial attack was a young man

by the name of Mitsuo Fuchida.

Fuchida had gained valuable experience

in the w*r against China,

and had now earned himself a

position as the man responsible

for overseeing and

directing the entire attack.

As he fired flares, a

fellow dive b*mber group,

who was no doubt anxious,

actually began their attack runs

earlier than was planned.

But at this point, it

made little difference.

So Fuchida called out

over the radio, "To, To, To,"

the code words to command

the entire first wave to attack.

After sh**ting at a couple of

unsuspecting leisure aircraft

on an early Sunday morning flight,

most of which were civilian,

the flights began to head

to their respective targets.

For the 49 high-level B5N bombers,

they were assigned to go

around the northwest side of Oahu

and approach the harbor from the south.

This allowed them to line

up well with Battleship Row.

The 40 B5N bombers

carrying torpedoes would take

a similar attack, but at low altitude,

and would be split up as

they approached the harbor.

Some would strike the western side,

while others would turn

around after passing the harbor,

and get the ideal angle of attack

for Battleship Row from the east.

Meanwhile, the 51 D4A dive

bombers came in over Oahu

from the north, preparing to

strike the main US airfields,

joined by 43 Zero fighters.

At approximately 7:49 a.m.

on December 7th of 1941,

11 minutes ahead of schedule,

the first attack took place

as the torpedo bombers,

the most vulnerable,

but also perhaps the most

deadly, approached Ford Island

and Battleship Road to take advantage

of the initial moments of surprise.

Here, we can see one of

the most important maps

in the history of World w*r II,

a post-mission report map

drawn on December 8th of 1941

by Commander Fuchida himself

noting with absolute

pinpoint detail and accuracy

the results of the attack

right down to what sort

of b*mb hit precisely where

on each American ship in the harbor.

In the title of the document,

we see, "Top Secret,

Estimated Damage Report.

"Against Surface Ships on

the Air Attack of Pearl Harbor,

"December 8th, 1941."

In this initial torpedo strike,

we see half of the northeast side squadron

led by Hirahita Matsumura,

who came upon the

retired battleship USS Utah

currently in use for training.

Here, Fuchida notes six torpedo strikes

coming in to sink the

ship, marking it with an X.

Matsumura himself, however,

recognized that this

was not a prime target,

and instead carried over

to the next available target

on the docks of the

southern side of the harbor.

Here, he saw ship

which he believed to

be the USS Pennsylvania,

as according to Japanese intelligence,

she was usually at anchor here.

In reality, however, she had recently left,

and instead this was a

mine layer and a light cruiser.

His flight dropped torpedoes,

and hit the USS Helena,

and damaged the mine layer USS Oglala,

which tried to pull away from the Helena,

so that the two did not sink each other.

At almost the same moment

as Fuchida watched from above

assigned as an air observer in his B5N

desperately taking notes,

the second line of torpedo

bombers began their attack,

coming into Battleship

Row from the southeast.

They would be led by ace

torpedo b*mber Shigeharu Murata.

These came in and hit Battleship Row hard,

with the most damage being

done to the USS Oklahoma

and USS West Virginia,

which both took repeated blows

as they sat on the exposed

outer side of Battleship Row.

The Oklahoma would take the worst of it,

being hit by so many torpedoes

that she quickly capsized,

and would not even be

targeted in the following strikes.

Also now taking place was

the arrival of dive bombers

from the north, now striking Ford Island.

According to some sources,

this dive b*mber flight

may have actually struck first

due to a miscommunication

earlier in the flares.

However, I don't think

that that is necessarily true,

as we can see in this famous photo taken

during the first wave.

Within it, we can see a

major spout from a torpedo

on what appears to be the opening attack

of the USS West Virginia,

and meanwhile, the airfield

appears to be mostly unscathed.

Also, noteworthy in this

photo is a clear indication

of the timeline of events.

Here, in a close-up, we

can see the USS Utah hit

in the first torpedo

attack from the north flight

already listing heavily,

and also here the fact that

the inner row of battleships

has no smoke or fire,

including the USS Arizona,

indicating that the high-level

bombers have not yet struck.

This puts the sequence

of events into perfect order.

So at almost the exact same moment,

perhaps a minute or two apart,

the Val dive bombers arrived

to strike the Ford Island airfield.

This flight were assigned

to take out the hangars

and aircraft at this air base,

and to render the runway useless.

Here, the famous hangar was hit by bombs

and machine g*nf*re,

which today still stands

and bears the scars from this attack.

One minute later, Zeros

and other Vals arrived

and opened up the attack

on the US Army aircraft

in the center of the island of Oahu.

Striking these smaller

airstrips was crucial

to prevent fighters from getting airborne

to hit the raiding bombers,

or worse, to potentially counter-attack

against the Japanese carrier fleet.

The Zeros would stray first,

hitting the grounded aircraft

that had been closely grouped

together to prevent sabotage.

Then the dive bombers came

in from above finishing the job

and striking hangars and

other important structures.

A similar method of attack

would follow at Wheeler Airfield,

Hickam Airfield, Ewa Mooring Mast Airfield,

as well as Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station

on the northeast of the island.

Meanwhile, the second most effective attack

was now beginning,

a high-level bombing

attack on Battleship Row.

This would come from the dead south,

lining up with Battleship Row

to give them the highest chance of success.

Fuchida in his own high-level b*mber

would help to lead this strike.

Here, on his map, we can see

the small red circles

indicating the reported hits

of the high-level bombers'

1,700-pound armor-piercing bombs.

We can see that hits were

landed on the USS Maryland

and the USS Tennessee,

both of which were protected

from the torpedo attacks

due to their location,

but would be heavily damaged

by these high-altitude bombers.

And then the final target in the crosshairs

of the high-altitude bombers

would be the USS Arizona.

According to Fuchida's post-mission report,

the Arizona would be hit by

four armor-piercing bombs,

the most of any battleship at Pearl.

One of these bombs would land a blow

that would take more life than perhaps

any other single moment of

the w*r for the American Navy

when it pierced the deck

of the mighty battleship

and ignited the forward magazine,

resulting in a cataclysmic

expl*si*n that k*lled 1,177

of the 1,512 crewmen on board.

Fascinatingly, this would be

the most noteworthy mistake

on Fuchida's after-action map,

as the USS Arizona of all ships was listed

as only severely damaged, rather than sunk.

This would be because the black smoke

and fires from the Arizona were so thick

that it completely obscured

his view of the ship,

and he was not able to confirm her sinking.

As the remaining Japanese Zeros

and Vals attacked a few airfield targets

with their remaining ammunition,

the first wave strike came to a close,

and the attackers

returned to the carrier fleet.

The entire ordeal had taken a half hour,

but the morning was not yet over.

Approximately 20 minutes later,

the second wave consisting

of 171 aircraft arrived

at Pearl Harbor to continue the attack.

This second strike would include

no B5N bombers with torpedoes,

but instead a greater

number of high-level bombers,

as well as many more D4A Val dive bombers.

Accompanying them as

well would be 35 A6M Zeros

assigned to escort and

defend this second wave.

The target of this

second strike was primarily

the leftover hangars,

aircraft, and surviving ships,

and this time, the attackers would approach

from the eastern side of Oahu.

Here, we can see one of the photos

from the high-level bombers on this raid

to get a good picture of what exactly

the harbor looked like at

the start of the second wave.

Due to the fact that

no carriers were present

and many of the battleships

had already taken heavy damage,

some of the primary targets of this attack

would be the ships at the docks

on the east side of the harbor.

These hits can be seen on Fuchida's map,

as he remained behind after

the first wave left to watch

and report the success of the second wave.

Here, we can see multiple

destroyers that were hit hard,

including the USS Shaw,

which famously exploded in dry docks

creating this iconic image.

- Also, the USS Nevada

became a notable target,

as she had tried to get

underway and exit the harbor.

She, however, became a

prime target for the dive bombers

of the second wave,

and was hit by what

Fuchida lists as eight bombs

shortly before she was run aground.

We also see that some of

the other Vals did indeed

try to finish off the battleships

that appeared to still be afloat.

This included the California

and the USS Maryland,

who each took multiple direct hits

from the second wave dive bombers.

The Zeros would also have

their work cut out for them

in the second wave,

as a handful of American

fighters did get into the air,

and there were still aircraft left

for strafing on the ground.

But for the most part,

the second wave was

less eventful than the first,

and American antiaircraft

crews were more alert

for the second attack,

resulting in a few more Japanese losses.

At 10:00 a.m. Hawaii Time,

the second wave was gone,

headed back to the carriers.

In the first two waves,

they had lost 29 aircraft,

no doubt good results

for the high-risk attack.

The third wave of the attack,

which was ready and willing,

was withdrawn at the

order of Admiral Nagumo,

who thought that the risk

of a third strike outweighed the return.

It appeared that the American

fleet was already crippled,

and his fleet was now surely within range

of American land-based bombers.

Thus, to protect the fleet, he withdrew,

and brought the attack to an end.

In addition, the carriers were not present,

and their location was unknown.

Should the American carriers

locate the Japanese fleet

while the third wave was still underway,

it could have disastrous

results for the Kido Butai.

Furthermore, if the

Japanese were to take off now

and strike Pearl with the third wave,

they would not return until

the darkness of evening,

and nighttime carrier

landings were not yet a tactic

that the Imperial Navy had mastered.

Thus, Nagumo believed

the right decision was

to withdraw the third strike.

Originally, Admiral Yamamoto

supported this decision,

but later stated that he regretted it,

and that a third wave

could've potentially done

substantially more damage

to the American fleet,

and specifically the oil reserves.

Miraculously, Mitsuo Fuchida,

the lead pilot for the

attack on Pearl Harbor,

and the author of the famous

Japanese damage report map

would survive not only the attack,

but also the remainder of the w*r.

In the Battle of Midway,

while on board the Akagi,

he was injured during the morning attacks

by American aircraft.

He would receive two broken ankles,

and was removed from

his duties as a combat pilot.

He would spend the rest of the w*r

as a staff officer in the Imperial Navy,

and was actually in Hiroshima at the time

of the atomic bombing in 1945.

Yet he would once again survive,

even though many of

his party traveling with him

at that moment would later

die of radiation poisoning.

He would eventually go on

to become a devout Christian,

and spent many of his

later years traveling the world

and spreading the gospel.

For the Japanese fleet, however,

despite the withdrawal of the third wave

and the missing American carriers,

the attack was indeed a success.

It accomplished the crippling

of the American Pacific Fleet

and sunk four American battleships,

giving the Japanese a crucial headstart

and an advantage on their

campaign in the South Pacific.

Unfortunately, it would have the opposite

of its intended effect,

with the attack widely considered dastardly

and underhanded by most Americans,

as no declaration of w*r

had yet been declared.

Instead of the American

public becoming sick of the w*r

and not wanting to

wage a drawn-out conflict,

it instead rallied the

American people together

in a quest for revenge.

And as Yamamoto had feared,

it would create an enemy

for Japan that would outlast

and outproduce them

in a long and brutal w*r.

As always, I'm TJ.

Thanks for watching,

and I'll see you next time.